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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers around the world face difficult ethical questions when seeking to
balance zealous representation of their clients with their duties to the justice
system. The tensions between the lawyers' duties to clients and to the court are
especially pronounced in criminal defense. Criminal cases pit the governmentoften a formidable adversary-against individuals with less power and typically
far fewer resources. If the government abuses its power, the consequences for
the defendant can be enormous. To counter the dangers of unfair prosecutions,
many legal systems give defense attorneys greater leeway to represent clients
aggressively in criminal cases-even to the point of permitting practices that
would not be tolerated in civil cases and would be downright abusive if
attempted by the prosecution.' Criminal defense attorneys must determine
where the limits of ethical practice lie in each case, and how closely they can
approach these limits to provide the client with a vigorous defense.
In international criminal trials, attorneys face new and potentially more
complex ethical dilemmas. The goals of international trials are broader and more
political than those of ordinary domestic trials, and the applicable procedures are
a unique hybrid of the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions. Yet existing Codes
of Conduct fail to take into account these special features of the international
criminal justice system and often fail to offer adequate guidance to attorneys. As
attorneys decide how to balance their duties to their clients and to the court,
they are generally left to act according to their own diverse domestic traditions.
This Article examines the ethical dilemmas of defense attorneys at international

Meredith Blake and Andrew Ashworth, Ethics and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 7 Legal Ethics 167,
168 (2004). The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example,
give criminal defense attorneys greater leeway to make meritless claims or contentions and to
introduce evidence (specifically the defendant's testimony) that they reasonably believe is false.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") R 3.1, 3.3 (ABA 2009). For a classic debate
about the appropriate ethical regulation in the context of criminal defense, consider William H.
Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Mich L Rev 1703 (1993); David Luban, Are Criminal
Defenders Diferent?, 91 Mich L Rev 1729 (1993).
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criminal courts and offers a new approach to resolving several of them, which is
consistent with the unique features and purposes of international criminal trials.
The traditional conception of criminal defense advocacy in England and
America was captured in the vivid (and endlessly cited) statement of Lord
Brougham in 1820:
[Ain advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons ... is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the
duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
consequences,2 though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country
in confusion.
The notion that an advocate owes no allegiance to any principles other than
those imposed by the law-and must subordinate all other considerations to that
of advancing the interests of the client-is perhaps the dominant understanding
of criminal defense representation in adversarial systems. Indeed, aggressive
advocacy at the limits of the law is sometimes itself taken to be an ethical duty of
defense attorneys. Some have read Lord Brougham to mean that "everything not
forbidden is required."' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) do not take things quite this far. While requiring that advocates zealously
protect and pursue their clients' interests, the Model Rules also provide that
lawyers are "not bound ... to press for every advantage that might be realized
for a client."4
Several considerations might be understood to lie beneath the more
moderate position expressed in the Model Rules. First, an attorney who
understands it to be his duty to press for every advantage that is arguably legal
will often find himself positioned on a razor's edge-attempting a delicate
balance between his duty of zealous representation and his duties to the court
(and the attendant prohibitions on practices such as delay tactics, frivolous
arguments, and subornation of perjury). Second, a lawyer must also evaluate
whether certain aggressive tactics will in fact advance the interests of his client,
or whether engaging in them is more likely to alienate the court and the jury,
prevent beneficial negotiations with the prosecution, or result in a loss of

2

2 Trial of Queen Caroline 3 Games Cockcroft & Co 1874).

3

Albert W. Alschuler, Lavjers and Truth-Telling, 26 Harv J Law & Pub Poly 189, 191 (2003)
(observing that many defense lawyers adopt this interpretation); Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable
Doubts: The O.J. Simpson Case and the CiminalJusticeSystem 145 (Simon & Schuster 1996), cited in id;
see also Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 1) (defining aggressive advocacy as "doing
anything arguably legal to advance the client's ends').
MRPC, pmbl, R 1.3 cmt 1 (cited in note 1).

4
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credibility that harms the client's cause. Finally, every thoughtful defense
attorney must wrestle with the difficult moral issues that accompany
representation of clients who are, in most cases, guilty. No less an adherent of
zealous defense than Alan Dershowitz has acknowledged, "if you're a decent
human being and you've been a victim of crime yourself and you have family
members that have been victims of crime, you feel tremendous turmoil." 5 All of
these difficulties weigh in favor of allowing defense attorneys greater flexibility
than would be allowed under the philosophy of "if it is permitted, it is required."
This Article does not propose to address the debate about how these issues
should be resolved in the domestic adversarial system, a topic that has been6
thoughtfully addressed by many scholars and practitioners over the years.
Instead, the Article examines the question of how these considerations translate
to the field of international criminal defense. Specifically, are there particular
features of international criminal courts that suggest different approaches to any
of the ethical questions that a defense lawyer confronts? Must a defense attorney
who adheres to the school of maximum aggressive advocacy when practicing in
an American court feel duty-bound to adopt the very same tactics when
practicing in an international court? Is any other approach acceptable?
I argue that distinctive features of international criminal courts and
prosecutions suggest a more flexible approach to the ethical norms governing
defense advocacy, closer to that embodied by the Model Rules. Moreover, I
suggest that international criminal courts should promulgate guidelines which
convey to defense attorneys that particular aggressive practices are not required
by ethical duties and that such practices may be more inconsistent than
consistent with good defense lawyering. I do not propose additional rules that
would absolutely prohibit such practices in international courts. Nor do I
suggest that defense attorneys should ever fail to diligently and zealously
represent their clients, or that any ethical guideline should permit such a failure. I
do, however, argue that in some of the areas that lie on the far reaches of
aggressive representation, international defense attorneys should be permitted
greater latitude than would be countenanced by the view that advocacy must
always be pursued to the very limits of legality.
To be sure, many of the considerations that call for aggressive
representation of criminal defendants at the domestic level hold true

5

Cheryl Lavin, PleadingHis Case:Alan DershowitZ Talks About the Gray Area Where Lanyers Live, Chi

6

Trib C1 (Feb 1, 1995).
See, for example, Alschuler, 26 HarvJ Law & Pub Poly at 189 (cited in note 3); Luban, 91 Mich L
Rev at 1729 (cited in note 1); Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 1); Abbe Smith,

Defending Defending: The Casefor Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terible Things, 28 Hofstra
L Rev 925, 934 (2000).
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internationally as well. Like most domestic courts, international criminal courts
aim to provide fair trials, consistent with defendants' rights to be presumed
innocent and effectively represented. To ensure the full realization of these
procedural rights, one may argue that international criminal defense attorneys are
duty-bound to press for any advantage within the limits of the law.
Yet international criminal trials, to a greater degree than domestic trials,
serve goals beyond that of determining guilt or innocence according to fair
procedures. These goals include providing an authoritative record of the crimes
for posterity, giving victims a forum in which to express their grief and outrage,
spreading support for human rights, and promoting peace and reconciliation.'
While it is not the job of the defense attorney to promote these broader goals,
they nonetheless at times suggest different approaches to the regulation of
defense attorney conduct.8
In addition, practice at international criminal courts-particularly the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which is the focus of this Article's
recommendations'-is based on a new procedural model that combines
inquisitorial and adversarial features. Compared to its adversarial counterpart,
the inquisitorial tradition generally takes a more reserved view of advocacy. It
gives judges important powers and responsibilities that belong to defense
attorneys in adversarial systems, and it expects less aggressive and partisan
conduct from defense attorneys. 10 To the extent that international criminal
procedures incorporate these inquisitorial features, it is sensible to adjust ethical
guidance accordingly.
Finally, two justifications commonly given to support aggressive advocacy
domestically-particularly in the US-appear less applicable internationally.
Many American criminal defense attorneys are so overwhelmed with cases that
they do not provide zealous (or even adequate) representation to their clients.
To discourage such disengaged advocacy, some commentators have called for
7
8

See Section 1I.A.
Defense attorneys generally believe that international criminal courts should focus on providing
fair trials to the accused and not be distracted by broader political goals. The attorneys are nearly
unanimous in their view that the defense should not be charged with advancing any of these
broader goals. At the same time, as I discuss in Section IV, many defense attorneys are inclined to
accept the specific limitations on defense attorney conduct suggested by these broader political

goals.
9

10

Because of the pending closure of the other two modern international criminal tribunals-the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), which is currendy scheduled to
complete trials by early 2012, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),
which is scheduled to complete trials by 2010-the ICC is the court that is likely to handle most
international criminal cases. For that reason, these recommendations are addressed primarily to
the ICC.
See Section II.B.
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strengthening and reinforcing ethical obligations of aggressive representation.
But international criminal defense attorneys, as a rule, already provide a great
deal of individual attention to their clients. They do not generally need to be
exhorted to be more partisan and aggressive. Similarly, the argument that
attorneys for guilty clients should be aggressive advocates in order to protest
unjust punishments is less persuasive at the international level. International
courts do not impose the death penalty and are not bound by harsh mandatory
sentencing laws, despite the extraordinary seriousness of the crimes they
adjudicate.
Professional regulation of defense advocacy at the international courts
should take account of these special features and goals of the international
criminal justice system. I address how this purposive approach to legal ethics
would apply to four key decisions that international criminal defense attorneys
may face: 1) whether to impeach victim-witnesses whom they know to be telling
the truth; 2) how to respond to clients who want to testify falsely; 3) whether to
allow clients whom the lawyer believes to be innocent to plead guilty; and 4)
whether to follow clients' instructions to boycott or disrupt the proceedings." In
some cases, the purposive interpretation may result in less aggressive advocacy
than might be warranted in an ordinary domestic criminal case. In others, it may
demand a more independent approach to making decisions about the client's
representation.
To implement the purposive approach set out in this Article, I propose
including a commentary to international courts' Codes of Conduct (particularly
the ICC Code), which would define more precisely the boundaries on aggressive
practices, working within existing rules. The commentary would not create new
categories of sanctionable conduct. Instead, it would lay out situations in which
attorneys are not required to engage in certain aggressive tactics or follow certain
client instructions. In some cases, it would also recommend a particular course
of action as most consistent with the attorneys' ethical obligations, while leaving
some flexibility to attorneys in how they interpret their duties before the ICC.
This Article does not propose to resolve conclusively all major ethical
dilemmas that confront international criminal defense attorneys. But by opening
up a conversation about the appropriate framework within which legal ethics
questions should be understood at international criminal courts, 12 it offers a
11
12

See Section Ii.
International criminal law scholarship has so far largely neglected the subject of legal ethics. The
few exceptions to this rule have focused on specific ethical questions facing defense attorneys and
have not aimed to provide a more comprehensive framework for legal ethics at international
criminal courts. See, for example, Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Problem of Seff-Representation at
InternationalCriminal Tribunals,4 J Ind Crim Just 64, 73 (2006); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Ethical
Obligations of Counsel in Criminal Proceedings: Representing an Unwilling Client, 12 Crim L F 487, 501
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coherent way to evaluate and resolve these questions according to the objectives
of the justice system in which they arise.

II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Goals of International Criminal Trials
The question of proper ethical practice at international criminal courts
necessarily involves a discussion of the objectives of these courts. International
criminal trials aspire to achieve multiple goals.13 As I have argued elsewhere,
these goals can be broadly divided into legal and political.' 4 From a legalist
perspective, the main function of trials is to determine individual culpability and
assess appropriate punishment through a fair process. 5 Punishment of the
guilty, in turn, serves the goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation."
Under the legalist view, justice demands that the trial focus on the evidence
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused and keep examination of
broader contextual questions to a minimum. Most international criminal defense
attorneys tend to accept this view. 17
Still, international criminal courts, as well as many academic commentators,
reject the exclusively legalist focus on individual culpability and fair procedures
as too narrow." They argue that international criminal law properly plays

13

14
15
16

17

18

(2001); Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Assisting an Accused to Represent Himsef."Appointment of Amii
Curiaeas The Most Appropriate Option, 4 J Intl Crim Just 47, 48 (2006). One recent article that offers
insightful description of the way ethical norms were created at the ICTY is Judith A. McMorrow,
Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in InternationalTribunals:A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B C Intl &
Comp L Rev 139 (2007). Another notable recent publication on the function and ethics of
international criminal defense attorneys is Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in
InternationalCriminalLaw (TMC Asset 2009).
Mirjan Damagka, What Is the Point of InternationalCriminalJustice?, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 329, 331
(2008); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perpectives on Law and Politics in InternationalCriminal Trials,
48 VaJ Intl L 529, 533-44 (2008).
Turner, 48 Va J Ind L at 534 (cited in note 13).
See, for example, Steven Kay and Bert Swart, The Role of the Defence, in Cassese, et al eds, 2 The
Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt:A Commentary 1421, 1421-22 (Oxford 2002).
There is a vigorous debate as to whether punishment, especially in the international context, can
actually achieve these goals. Consider Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can InternationalCriminal
Justice Prevent FutureAtrociies?, 95 Am J Ind L 7 (2001); Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, Do International
Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate HumanitarianAtrocities?, 84 Wash U L Rev 777 (2006); David
Wippman, Atrodties, Deterrence,and the Limits of InternationalJusice,23 Fordham Ind L J 473 (1999).
Turner, 48 VaJ Ind L at 566-68 (cited in note 13).
See, for example, Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and PoliticalTrials 112 (1964) (noting that
international courts have political aims separate from courts' usual focus on legalism); Tuinstra,
Defence Counsel in InternationalCriminalLaw at 147 (cited in note 12) (concluding that international
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additional roles. It aims to serve broader political purposes, such as promoting
long-term peace and stability, fostering respect for human rights, creating a
historical record, and providing closure for victims and communities affected by
the crimes. While courts and commentators have identified many competing
goals, they have offered little guidance as to how to prioritize among them. 9
This complicates judgments about substantive, procedural, and ethical rules
in international criminal courts. Confusion is most likely to occur when the
broader political aims of international criminal trials clash with the goal of
adjudicating individual culpability. For example, the clash between the
adjudicative and political goals can deepen tensions between attorneys' duties to
their clients and their duties to the court. To understand why it is nonetheless
important to accommodate the broader political goals of international criminal
law, one must understand how these goals have helped define the law.
At least since the post-Second World War trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo,
international criminal trials have been celebrated for helping create an accurate
historical record of the crimes. As Justice Robert Jackson, the chief American
prosecutor at Nuremberg argued, one of the most important contributions of
the Nuremberg trial was to establish "undeniable proofs of incredible events." 2
Others also saw one of the trial's chief achievements as educating local
populations about the crimes committed in their name and preventing
revisionist accounts of the past.2'
Modern international criminal tribunals have similarly emphasized that the
establishment of an authoritative record can discourage historical revisionism,
restore peace, and prevent future acts of aggression.22 In fact, because of the

19

courts tend to pursue policy-implementing goals more than legalist, or conflict-solving, goals);
Turner, 48 VaJ Intl L at 535-43 (cited in note 13).
Recently, commentators have begun paying greater attention to this question and have begun to

21

suggest ways to prioritize objectives. Consider Mark A. Drumbl, AtodF, Punishment, and
InternationalLaw (Cambridge 2007); Mark J. Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrodty (Cambridge 2009);
Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through
TransnationalNetworks, 50 BC L Rev 1 (2009); Stephanos Bibas and Bill Burke-White, International
Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-ProcedureRealism, U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research
Paper
No
09-10
(Feb
12,
2009),
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1381011 (visited Nov 21, 2009); Damaika,
83 Chi Kent L Rev 329 (cited in note 13).
International Military Tribunal, Nov 21, 1945, Morning Session, in 2 Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 Nov 1945-1 Oct 1946, 95,
99 (1947).
See, for example, Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and PoliticalTrials at 155-56 (cited in note 18).

22

See, for example, Prosecutorv Nikoli, Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Judgment,

20

60 (Dec 2, 2003); UN

SCOR 55th Sess, 4161st mtg at 3, UN Doc S/PV.4161 Oune 20, 2000) (statement of J. Claude
Jorda); Interview by Editorial Board of TransnationalLaw and Contemtporay Problems with Richard
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value of presenting important historical evidence at trial, some judges at these
tribunals have been reluctant to accept guilty pleas, "which may only establish
the bare factual allegations in an indictment or may be supplemented
by a
23
accused.,
the
by
responsibility
of
acceptance
and
statement of facts
Still, some commentators have expressed reservations about entrusting
courts with the task of creating a historical record. Their main concern is that
the focus on producing a complete historical record may be in tension with the
principle of individual culpability. 24 Under traditional notions of criminal law,
the trial must focus on the specific charges against the defendant. Evidence of
mass complicity, foreign involvement, or even the true origins of the conflict
may not be relevant to these charges and may be prejudicial. 25 When the
prosecution introduces evidence to establish historical facts beyond those that
prove the charges against the defendant, "the temptation is great to hold any
26
given defendant responsible for as wide a swath of destruction as possible."
This tension between compiling an accurate historical record and determining
individual culpability has existed since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and
continues to arise in today's international criminal proceedings.27
International criminal law also serves the important educational purpose of
fostering respect for the rule of law and human rights. Commentators have
argued that decisions of international criminal courts can "strengthen [ ] a sense
of accountability for international crime by exposure and stigmatization of these
extreme forms of inhumanity."2 8 As courts consistently denounce international
criminal conduct in judgments that claim the respect of relevant local and
international constituencies, they help ensure that human rights law will be
increasingly followed.29
Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and the ICTR (Dec 13, 1995), in Living Histoy Interview
with Judge RichardGoldstone, 5 Transnad L & Contemp Probs 373, 377-78 (1995).
23

Nikolic, Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Judgment at

24

26

Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Assodations: Joint Criminal Enteprise,
Command Responsibilfiy, and the Development of InternationalCriminalLaw, 93 Cal L Rev 75, 95 (2005).
Developments in the Law-The Promises of InternationalProsecution, 114 Harv L Rev 1943, 1973 (2001)
(noting this tension and citing a number of sources that have acknowledged it); Mark J. Osiel,
Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U Pa L Rev 463, 560-63 (1995)
(pointing out the constraining effects of temporal jurisdiction); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The
Eleventh Annual WaldemarA. Soff Lecture: The ChangingNature of the Laws of War, 156 Milit L Rev 30,
44 (1998) (observing that trial records may not reflect the role of foreign actors).
Danner and Martinez, 93 Cal L Rev at 95 (cited in note 24).

27

Turner, 48 VaJ Intl L at 541 (cited in note 13).

28

Damaika, 83 Chi Kent L Rev at 345 (cited in note 13); see also Drumbl, Atrociy, Punishment,and
InternationalLaw at 173-76 (cited in note 19); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentaliy, Expressivism,
and Genocide, 2 Intl Crim L Rev 93, 120-24 (2002).
Damaika, 83 Chi Kent L Rev at 345 (cited in note 13).

25

29
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The educative function of international criminal trials influences debates
about procedures and ethical practices at international criminal courts. For
example, some have argued that, to strengthen the educational message of
international trials, courts ought to "relax f the bipolar pressures that arise from
proceedings organized as a contest of two partisan cases." 3 According to the
proponents of this approach, a shift toward judicially-directed trials would keep
inappropriate political arguments at bay and enable the court to send a more
coherent message about the importance of human rights, without the many
distractions and controversies generated by the party antagonists.31 But while
less adversarial proceedings might permit the court to deliver more easily the
message it desires to send, they might also interfere with the defendant's ability
to mount a full and effective defense and to make key choices about his
representation.
International criminal courts also aspire to promote peace and
reconciliation in the regions affected by their judgments. Many believe that trials
can help to break cycles of violence by providing a regularized, peaceful way of
settling accounts. As commentators on the Nuremberg trials observed, trials
contribute to peace by "replac[ing] private, uncontrolled vengeance with a
measured process of fixing guilt in each case, and taking the power to punish out
of the hands of those directly injured. ' 3 2 The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has embraced this rationale, observing that "[t]he
only civilised alternative to th[e] desire for revenge is to render justice." 33 By
contrast, "impunity of the guilty only would fuel the desire for vengeance in the
former Yugoslavia, jeopardising the return to the 'rule of law', 'reconciliation'
and the restoration of 'true peace. ' 3 4 The ICTY's judgment in Prosecutorv Nikoli
summarizes the argument that trials contribute to peace and reconciliation:
The tribunal was further to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace through criminal proceedings. The immediate consequence of such
proceedings was the removal of those persons most responsible for the
commission of crimes in the course of-and even in furtherance of-the
armed conflict. Additionally, by holding individuals responsible for the crimes
committed, it was hoped that a particular ethnic or religious group (or even
political organisation) would not be held responsible for such crimes by

30

Id at 357.

31

Id.

32

Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and PoliticalTrials at 158 (cited in note 18).

33

The President of the International Tribunal, First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
15, UN Doc S/1994/1007,
A/49/342 (Aug 29, 1994); see also id at IT 11-14.

34

ProsecutorvErdemovi4,Case No IT-96-22, Judgment,

58, 9 58 n 17 (Nov 29, 1996).
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members of other ethnic or religious groups, and that the guilt of the few
35
would not be shifted to the innocent.

A trial may therefore be fully consistent with both the legal purpose of
apportioning individual guilt and the political purpose of promoting peace and
reconciliation. But if the latter comes to be seen as the primary purpose of
international trials, rather than an incidental consequence, this could produce
tensions with the adjudicative function of trials. Courts might be inclined, for
example, to make sentencing decisions based on the effect they would have on
peace and reconciliation and not based on the defendants' relative
blameworthiness.3 6 An empirical survey of the ICTY and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) suggests, however, that to date, these courts have
not allowed the goals of achieving peace and reconciliation to noticeably
influence their sentencing decisions.37
inally, international criminal trials aim to help survivors of the crimes and
the affected communities achieve a sense of closure. Trials serve this function by
providing a forum for victims to tell their stories and have the wrongs done to
them formally acknowledged.3 8 As the ICTY reported in 1997, "witnesses who
have come to The Hague have commented afterwards that the opportunity to
testify before a duly constituted court has brought them great relief. Justice's
cathartic effects may therefore promise hope for recovery and
reconciliation.. . ."'9 Even more than its predecessors, the ICC emphasizes the
importance of restorative justice and incorporates in its procedures a concern

35
36

Nikoli, Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Judgment, 60.
An example of this tension is the plea agreement between 1CTY prosecutors and Biljana Plavgii,
the former co-President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who helped
implement the Bosnian Serbs' ethnic-cleansing campaign against Bosnian Muslims and Croats. As
part of the plea agreement, the prosecution withdrew genocide charges against Plavik and argued
that Plavgk's guilty plea was "an unprecedented contribution to the establishment of truth and a
significant effort toward the advancement of reconciliation." On the basis of this
recommendation and related evidence, the court sentenced Plavgi6 to only eleven years in prison.
Bosnian victims of ethnic cleansing were outraged by the low sentence. Nancy Amoury Combs,
Procuring Guily Pleasfor InternationalCrimes: The Limited Influence of Sentence Discounts, 59 Vand L Rev
69, 92-93, 93 n 105 (2006).

37

See Joseph W. Doherty and Richard H. Steinberg, An EmpiricalStudy of IC-Y and ICTR Sentencing:
Doctrine Versus Practice, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper 5859 (Aug 3, 2009), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1443468 (visited Nov 21, 2009).

38

Erdemovil, Case No IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment,
65 (Nov 29, 1996); The Promises of
InternationalProsecution, 114 Harv L Rev at 1970-71 (cited in note 25); Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav
War Crimes Tribunal:An Interim Assessment, 7 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 15, 19 (1997).

39

The Secretary-General, Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 192, UN Doc A/52/375, S/1997/729 (Sept
18, 1997).
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for victims' interests.4 ° It allows victims to participate in the proceedings, to be
represented by attorneys, and to claim reparations.
At the same time, tensions can arise between the desire to give voice and
closure to victims and certain procedural rights of the accused. Protective
measures for witnesses may interfere with a defendant's right to confront his
accusers. 41 Allowing hundreds of witnesses to tell their full stories or to actively
participate in the proceedings risks introducing evidence that may not be strictly
relevant to the questions at hand and could be prejudicial to the defendant's
case. 42 More broadly, some have argued that a focus on the victims deflects from
the main purpose of the trial-judging the accused and his deeds.43
This last conflict-between victims' and defendants' rights-is often
present in domestic trials as well. But for several reasons, it is more pronounced
at the international level. First, victims of international crimes are generally more
numerous, and the crimes are, on average, more severe and atrocious than the
majority of crimes adjudicated in domestic cases. The exceptional severity and
magnitude of international crimes tends to magnify the desire to protect victims'
interests, even at the expense of defendants' rights.44 Moreover, victims of

international crimes have ordinarily suffered at the hands of a ruthless
government. At the domestic level, those who argue for stronger defense rights
are usually concerned about the possibility that the government will wrongfully
exercise its power against individuals. But at the international level, it is typically
the defendants who are accused of abusing state power. For that reason, even
"[m]any traditionally liberal actors (such as non-governmental organizations or
academics), who in a national system would vigilantly protect defendants and
potential defendants, are among the most strident pro-prosecution voices,
arguing for broad definitions and modes of liability and for narrow
defences ....."'

In short, several political goals-compiling an accurate historical record,
spreading a message of respect for human rights, promoting peace and
reconciliation, and giving voice to victims of horrible wrongdoing-have played
40
41

See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, International Decision, Civil Party Partidpation in Provisional Detention
Appeals, Extraordinagy Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 103 Am J Ind L 116, 120-21 (2009).
Consider Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 Am J

42

Ind L 235 (1996).
See, for example, Turner, 103 Am J Intl L at 119, 121-22 (cited in note 40).

43

See Hannah Arendt, Eicbmann in Jerusalem 5, 18 (Penguin Books 1994); Milner S. Ball, The Promise
of American Law 56 (1981), cited in Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memogy, and the Law 65
(1997).

44

See Darryl Robinson, The Identi Crisis of InternationalCriminal Law, 21 Leiden J Ind L 925, 929
(2008).

45

Id at 930.
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a dominant role in shaping international criminal proceedings. It is reasonable to
believe that, just as they have influenced procedural and substantive elements of
international criminal law, these political goals ought to influence interpretations
of ethical duties. Legal ethics at international criminal courts should not simply
copy domestic models grounded in different social and moral conventions. They
should accurately reflect the broader normative commitments of the
international criminal justice system.
It is not the burden of defense attorneys to assume responsibility for
advancing these broader goals of international criminal law. But defense
attorneys are crucial participants in the system, and the standards and guidelines
that apply to their behavior must not fail entirely to recognize these important
goals. As I discuss in Section IV, although international criminal defense
attorneys do not believe that their behavior should generally be guided by the
broader political objectives of international criminal law, they do appear to
accept the limits that these purposes may impose on their conduct in many
concrete situations.
B. Influence of the Inquisitorial Tradition
The rules of procedure and evidence of international criminal courts were
deliberately designed to reflect a mix of the adversarial and inquisitorial
traditions. This hybrid procedural framework also calls for a fresh and distinct
approach to legal ethics. Attorneys at international criminal courts must
reconcile adversarial notions of zealous defense with the less aggressive practices
associated with the inquisitorial system. Because most attorneys practicing
before the international criminal courts come from inquisitorial systems, their
behavior will often align with the inquisitorial approach and may further steer
the development of international legal ethics in that direction. To understand the
effect of this mix of legal traditions-and the unique confluence of procedure it
produces for international criminal trials-it is useful to compare the main
features of the adversarial and inquisitorial approaches, particularly as they relate
to the ethics of criminal defense.
1. The Inquisitorial and Adversarial Approaches to Ethics in Criminal
Defense
The inquisitorial and adversarial traditions assign different responsibilities
to the participants in criminal trials. In the adversarial system, defense attorneys
bear the burden of conducting investigations that may help the defendant.
Although the prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession,
the defense cannot rely on the prosecution to gather such evidence in the first
place. At trial, the parties, not the court, are in charge of presenting the evidence
and examining witnesses. The judge is not expected to intervene to ensure that
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all the relevant evidence is brought out, even if the judge observes that a defense
attorney is failing in his task to do so. This distribution of responsibilities during
investigation and trial has implications for the ethical duties of defense attorneys.
Independent investigation of the facts and zealous advocacy at trial are expected
of defense attorneys in adversarial systems, whereas such duties are not imposed
on their counterparts in inquisitorial systems.
In inquisitorial systems, both the police and the prosecution have the duty
to investigate exculpatory, as well as inculpatory, evidence. 46 This evidence is
compiled in an investigative file, which is typically accessible to the defense and
the judge before trial. Judges play an active role in the proceedings, examining
the charges and requesting modifications if necessary, questioning witnesses,
requesting further evidence-gathering as needed, and even raising issues on
behalf of the defense. The role of defense attorneys is more limited. For
example, the defense attorney is not expected to gather evidence on her own.
Her primary duty is to interpret the evidence gathered by the state in a manner
favorable to her client. 47 In some inquisitorial countries, the traditional role of
defense attorney has been to present an oral argument, at which the attorney
could "bring before the tribunal the human reality of his client, usually in the
hope of securing a lenient sentence." 48 As a result, in many cases, the attorney
mainly works to persuade the client to show remorse and potential for
rehabilitation and thus obtain a lower sentence-a strategy sometimes referred
' 49
to as "defense de connivence" or "collusion defense.
It should be noted that many contemporary criminal justice systems that
are still described as inquisitorial no longer neatly fit this model. Germany, Italy,
and several Latin American and Eastern European countries have introduced
46

47

48

49

In practice, prosecutors and police frequently fail to actively investigate such evidence even in
inquisitorial systems. See, for example, Heribert Ostendorf, Strafvereitelung durch Strafverteidigung, 28
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1345, 1348 (1978). For a similar observation with respect to
French investigative judges, see Jacqueline Hodgson, The Role of the Criminal Defence Lanyer in an
InquisitorialProcedure:Legal and EthicalConstraints, 9 Legal Ethics 125, 135-36, 136 n 48 (2006).
See, for example, Mirjan Damaika, The Faces ofJustice and State Authoriy 178 (Yale 1986); Leonard
L. Cavise, The Transitionfrom the Inquisitorialto the Accusatorial System of Trial Procedure: Why Some
LatinAmerican Lawyers Hesitate, 53 Wayne L Rev 785, 793 (2007); Hodgson, 9 Legal Ethics at 140,
143 (cited in note 46).
John Leubsdorf, Man in His Orginal Digni : Legal Ethics in France 83 (Ashgate 2001); see also
Andr6 Dumont, L'avocat aupnal,auxiliairede lajusice?, 5 Deviance et socit6 55, 55, 56, 60 (1981)
(arguing that the primary role of the defense attorney is to relate the defendant's personality to the
judge).
See Henri Ader and Andr6 Damien, Rogles de la Profession d'Avocat §§ 31.52, 86.09 (11th ed 2006)
(discussing "defense de rupture" and "defense de connivence"; see also Leubsdorf, Man in His
OrginalDignit:Legal Ethics in France at 83 (cited in note 48) (noting that the main goal of defense
attorneys in France is to secure a lenient sentence for their clients and that judges in France often
believe that the role of defense attorneys is not to defend, but to console their clients).
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important adversarial features to their proceedings, such that it is more
50
appropriate to call them "mixed" rather than inquisitorial systems.
Accordingly, the responsibilities of defense attorneys to investigate and present
their clients' cases proactively have increased. As the procedural framework has
changed, interpretations of ethical norms have also shifted toward the
adversarial model of partisan defense."' Defense attorneys have also become
more assertive in their representation, leading some judges and scholars to
lament the rise of "conflict defense" or "excessive defense. 52
Still, the adversarial system remains largely party-led, whereas even mixed
systems leave most of the evidence-gathering to the police and prosecution and
control over the presentation of the evidence to judges. Defense attorneys in
adversarial systems are still more likely to feel personal responsibility for the
success or failure of a case53 and more likely to believe that aggressive advocacy
is justified to advance the client's case. 54
More broadly, inquisitorial and mixed systems continue to place a greater
emphasis on seeking the precise truth and creating an authoritative record of
events. 55 Although all criminal justice systems view the pursuit of truth as a
central goal, adversarial systems are typically more willing to suspend some
56
truth-seeking efforts in order to ensure the preservation of individual liberties.
50

John Jackson, TransnationalFaces of Justice: Two Attempts to Build Common Standards Bgond National

51

Boundaries, in John Jackson, et al, eds, Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International
Context 221, 224 (Hart 2008).
See, for example, Ostendorf, 28 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 1348 (cited in note 46).

52

Michael Bohlander, A Sily Question? Court SanctionsAgainst Defence Counselfor TrialMisconduct Crim
L F 467, 471 (1999); see also David Luban, The Sources of Legal Ethics: A German-American
Comparison of Lanyers' Professional Duties, 48 RabelsZ 245, 281, 283 (1984) (finding that German
attorneys are more adversarial in their outlook than the formal rules of ethics and procedure
might suggest). Even in France, which continues to be a more classic inquisitorial system, defense
de rupture (conflict defense) appears to have become a viable alternative to the defense de
connivence (collusion defense). Ader and Damien, Rigles de laProfession d'Avocat at
31.52, 86.09
(cited in note 49). But see Hodgson, 9 Legal Ethics at 143 (cited in note 46) (noting that despite
some advances in defense rights in France, the defense attorney's role is still primarily to
complement the official inquiry by the state and to lend moral support to the accused).

53

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Angelo Dondi, Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study 68 (Stanford 2004).

54

See David Luban, Tweno Theses on the AdversarialSystem, in Helen Stacy and Michael Lavarch, eds,
Beyond the Adversarial System 134, 139-40 (Federation 1999) (discussing the link between the
adversarial system and zealous advocacy).

55

See, for example, Elisabetta Grande, Dances of CriminalJustice:Thoughts on Systemic Differences and the
Search for the Truth, in Jackson, et al, eds, Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and
International Context at 146-47 (cited in note 50); Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About
Truth?:A German Perspective, 26 Harv J L & Pub Poly 157, 167-73 (2003).
Felicity Nagorcka, et al, Stranded Between Partisanshipand the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of Legal
Ethics inthe Adversarialand InquisitorialSystems ofJusice, 29 Melb U L Rev 448, 462 (2005); Weigend,
26 Harv J L & Pub Poly at 167-73 (cited in note 55); see also Leubsdorf, Man in ttis Original

56
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For example, adversarial systems are generally more likely to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, to scrupulously honor a suspect's right to remain silent, and
to give suspects broader access to counsel during interrogations. The greater
emphasis that inquisitorial systems place on the discovery of the "objective"
truth (even if at the expense of what might be viewed as important individual
rights in adversarial systems) also helps to explain the more limited involvement
of defense attorneys in the criminal process. From the perspective of
inquisitorial systems, aggressive defense lawyers are more likely to place
obstacles on the road to truth. 7
Ultimately, while both systems value truth-seeking, they differ significantly
in the procedural paths they take toward discovering the truth.5 8 Whereas
inquisitorial systems place greater confidence in the impartiality of judges,
adversarial systems are more skeptical.5 9 They assign investigative responsibilities
to two opposing parties, rather than to court officials. They also structure the
criminal process to err on the side of wrongful acquittals rather than wrongful
convictions. Participants in the adversarial system are fond of the well-known
maxim that it is better that ten guilty men should go free than that one innocent
should suffer.6" While inquisitorial systems certainly attempt to avoid convicting
the innocent and also place a high burden of proof on the prosecution, the
notion of a trade-off between wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions is
less pervasive.
The different relative weight that the two systems place on the search for
truth and the rights of the accused has implications for ethical rules as well.
Zealous advocacy is a central ethical principle for criminal defense attorneys in
most adversarial systems. While the debate continues as to whether defense
attorneys in adversarial systems are ethically bound to press for absolutely every
advantage that may be legally available to the client, there is no question that
they must pursue their client's cause with zeal and act as true partisans. 6' If they
fail to do so-even if it is because they have moral problems with the tactics

58

Dignity: Legal Ethics in France at 53 (cited in note 48) ("[T]he French tend to see trials as
celebrations of order through the recognition of objective truth and law, rather than as
celebrations of individual rights or discussions from which valid solutions will emerge ... ").
Dama~ka, The Faces of Jusfice and State Authoiiti at 177 (cited in note 47); Hodgson, 9 Legal Ethics
at 129, 129 n 16, 144 (cited in note 46); Nagorcka, et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 462 (cited in note
56).
Grande, Dances of CriminalJusticeat 146 (cited in note 55).

59

Nagorcka, et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 462 (cited in note 56).

60

4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *358. For a history of the permutations of this saying,
consider Alexander Volokh, N Guily Men, 146 U Pa L Rev 173 (1997).
See, for example, Murray Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountabilioy of Lanyers, 66 Cal L Rev
669, 672-73 (1978).
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used or the ends pursued-they may be seen as failing to fulfill their duty.62
Because the adversarial system expects that lawyers would not restrain their
advocacy on moral grounds, it also does not hold them morally accountable "for
[either] the ends pursued by the client [or] the63means of pursuing those ends,
provided that both means and ends are lawful.
The adversarial system also generally views the lawyer as the agent of the
client and requires the lawyer to consult the client regularly on matters that may
substantially affect the client's interests. 64 Lawyers must follow the clients'
instructions on many significant decisions unless these instructions are
unlawful. 6' This agency relationship between lawyer and client supports the
notion that lawyers are not morally accountable for the means and ends of
representation, provided they are acting within the letter of the law. It also
arguably helps contribute to the greater partisanship of American criminal
defense, as it strengthens lawyers' commitment to advance the client's goals by
any legal means possible.
Inquisitorial systems generally take a more restrained view of advocacy.
Their codes of conduct do not urge zealousness.66 Instead, they emphasize
virtues such as "dignity, conscience, independence, integrity, and humanity,"
"delicacy, moderation, [and] courtesy," and, with respect to clients,
"competence, devotion, diligence, and prudence. 67 Some inquisitorial systems
not only do not require aggressive defense, but also tend to expect the defense
to cooperate in the administration of justice and the revelation of the truth.68
62

Luban, 48 RabelsZ at 253-54 (cited in note 52).

63

Luban, Twenfy Theses on the AdversarialSystem at 140 (cited in note 54).

64
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See, for example, Leubsdorf, Man in His OriginalDigniy: Lgal Ethics in France at 18 (cited in note
48); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibili' of the Ciminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 Mich L Rev 1469, 1477-78 (1966) (arguing that a lawyer may discuss moral issues
with clients, but ordinarily must bow to the client's will).
MRPC R 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . .In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether
the client will testify.') (cited in note 1).
Luban, 48 RabelsZ at 267 (cited in note 52).
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Art
Barreau
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http://www.avocatparis.org/ribp.htm (visited Nov 21, 2009); Leubsdorf, Man in His Original
Dignity: Legal Ethics in France at 39 (cited in note 48); see also Luban, 48 RabelsZ at 267-68 (cited
in note 52); Damaika, The Faces ofJustice and State Authoiy at 177-78 (cited in note 47).
See, for example, Hodgson, 9 Legal Ethics at 134-35, 141, 143 (cited in note 46); see also Art 30
of Estatuto General de la Abogacia Espanola (BOE 2001) ("The fundamental obligation of a
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For example, they still regard defendants as an important source of information
and expect them to testify in the proceedings, despite a formal right to remain
silent.69 To encourage such testimony, inquisitorial systems allow defendants to
give an unsworn statement and do not subject them to perjury charges for
testifying falsely.7 ° They also permit courts to draw adverse inferences from a
failure to testify, and judges and attorneys make this plain to defendants, directly
or indirectly.7 ' Similarly, defense attorneys are not expected to challenge
aggressively the official judicial inquiry into the facts of the case. They are not
supposed to investigate independently, but to submit requests for investigation
to the court.7 2 They also cannot develop arguments that suggest a client's
innocence if they know such arguments to be false.7 3 And as a general rule, they
cannot impeach a witness whom they know to be telling the truth. 4
Lawyers' autonomy from clients is also greater in inquisitorial than in
adversarial systems. Thus, French avocats have traditionally been seen as
"absolutely free," "master[s] of [their] argument," and "sovereign judges of the
means of defense" in deciding how to conduct a case." German lawyers, too,
generally hold the belief that the client must accept representation on their
terms, rather than dictating his own to them. 6 Lawyers in these systems are seen
as more capable than the client of determining the best interests of the client and
have broad discretion to decide on the ends and means of representation. As a

69

70
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http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/en-spain-bylawspdfl-l 18888984
0.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009); Code of Conduct Regulations [CCR] Arts 24(1), 24()(b) (Cyprus)
("Advocates must always have in mind that they serve justice and cooperate toward its
administration."); Damaika, The Faces ofJusice and State Authoriy at 174-76 (cited in note 47).
Damaika, The Faces ofJusice and State Authoriy at 165 (cited in note 47) ("[W] ell into the twentieth
century, some Western European countries expressly provided that the criminal defendant had a
duty to answer, and it is by no means clear that many systems presently in force do not still tacitly
assume such a duty.'); Rene Lettow Lerner, The Intersecion of Two Systems: An American on Trialfor
an American Murder in the French Cour D'Assises, 2001 U Ill L Rev 791,824-27 (2001).
Damaika, The Faces ofJusice and State Authoriy at 166, 168 (cited in note 47); Lerner, 2001 U Ill L
Rev at 827 (cited in note 69).
Lemer, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 825 (cited in note 69) (observing that through the tone of their
questions, French judges suggest that they expect defendants to respond).
Some commentators therefore describe them as auxiliaries to the judge, rather than as primary
actors in the truth-seeking process. Hodgson, 9 Legal Ethics at 134 (cited in note 46).
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Id at 141.
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See Section li.A.
Leubsdorf, Man in His OriginalDigniy: Legal Ethics in Franceat 16 (cited in note 48).
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Luban, 48 RabelsZ at 266 (cited in note 52) (noting that the German system regards lawyers as
advisors to, rather than mere representatives of,their clients).
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result, they are less able to distance themselves from the social implications of
what they do and say in support of their clients.77
2. The Influence of the Inquisitorial Tradition at International
Criminal Courts
The differences between the inquisitorial and adversarial traditions play out
regularly in international courtrooms. The procedural regimes of the ICTY,
ICTR, and ICC incorporate elements of each tradition. Inquisitorial practices are
becoming more prominent at the ICC and, increasingly, at the ICTY and ICTR
as well.78 The following is a brief sketch of some of the key inquisitorial features
that influence the roles and the professional conduct of trial participants.79
As in inquisitorial systems, defense attorneys at the ICC can rely on the
prosecution to gather at least some exculpatory evidence for them. ICC
prosecutors have obligations rcgarding the collection and disclosure of evidence
that are more significant than those of prosecutors in the American system.
They must look for exonerating as well as incriminating evidence.80 And while
prosecutors need not turn over the entire investigative file to the court and the
defense, as they would in pure inquisitorial systems, they do have extensive
disclosure obligations early in the process. They must disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence "as soon as practicable."81 ICC judges have interpreted this
to mean that the prosecution has an ongoing obligation to disclose such
evidence and that the obligation begins before the charges are confirmed.82 Even
77
78

Nagorcka, et al, 29 Melb U L Rev at 466 (cited in note 56).
See, for example, Kai Ambos, InternalionalCriminalProcedure: 'Adversarial," ' nquisitorial," or Mixed?,
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3 Intl Crim L Rev 1, 5-6 (2003).
For a more thorough analysis, consider id; Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International
CriminalLaw in Outline: Anatom of a Unique Compromise, 1 J Intl Crim Just 603 (2003) (describing
the ICC); Alphons Oie, Accusatorialv InquisitorialApproachin InternationalCriminalProceedingsPriorto
the Establishment of the ICC and in Proceedings Before the ICC, in Cassese, et al, eds, The Rome Statute of
the InternationalCriminalCourt: A Commentay 1439 (cited in note 15).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC Statute' (1998), Art 54 (1)(a), 37 ILM

81

999 (1998) ("The Prosecutor shall in order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover
all facts and evidence . . . and . . . investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances
equally.").
Id, Art 67(2) ("In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor

79
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shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused.. . ."). By
contrast, in the US, even some exculpatory evidence need not be disclosed "as soon as
practicable." United States v Rui7, 536 US 622, 629 (2002) (holding that impeachment evidence,
which is often key to the defense's ability to uncover flaws in the government's case, need not be
disclosed prior to plea negotiations).
Prosecutor v l banga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure
and the Establishment of a Timetable,
125-29 (May 15, 2006); Prosecutor v Katanga, Case No
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before the hearing to confirm the charges, prosecutors must also disclose
evidence on which they will rely to argue that charges should be confirmed.83 At
the ICC, all disclosed evidence must also be communicated to the Pre-Trial
Chamber (a three-judge panel that decides on pretrial matters),8 4 making the
process somewhat similar to the dossier system of inquisitorial countries, in
which the court receives the entire investigative file before trial. The broader
disclosure responsibilities of prosecutors help level the resource disparities
between prosecution and defense and arguably reduce the need for aggressive
defense.
The inquisitorial tradition has also influenced judicial responsibilities at
international criminal courts. Judges have broad authority to manage the
proceedings and the presentation of evidence.8" Under Article 69(3) of the ICC
Statute, the court has "the authority to request the submission of all evidence
that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth., 8 6 The presiding
judge "may give directions for the conduct of the proceedings,"8 7 and only if she
does not issue such directions do the prosecutor and the defense "agree on the
order and manner in which the evidence shall be submitted."88 ICC judges
therefore have broad discretion to determine how adversarial or inquisitorial the
trial proceedings will be. Based on the experience with the first case before the
court, it is likely that the proceedings will be a mix of the two models.8 9 As in

83

ICC-01/04-01/07-60, Decision Modifying the Calendar for the Disclosure of the Supporting
Materials of the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Germain Katanga, 8-9
(Nov 5, 2007). The ICC has enforced the prosecution's disclosure duties quite strictly. It was
prepared to terminate its first case and release a defendant from custody as a remedy for
disclosure violations by the prosecution. See Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J Intl
Crim Just 409, 409-10 (2008).
International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("ICC RPE'), R 77, UN Doc
ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) ("The Prosecutor shall . . . permit the defence to inspect any books,
documents, photographs and other tangible objects . . . which are . . . intended for use by the
Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial .. .
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Id, R 121(2)(c).
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Ambos, 3 Intl Crim L Rev at 19 (cited in note 78) ("[Judges are] responsible for the conduct of
proceedings, may require the production of evidence, and rule on any other relevant matters.")
(citations to ICC Statute omitted).
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ICC Statute, Art 69(3).
Id, Art 64(8)(b).
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ICC RPE, R 140.
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In the first case before the ICC, the court recognized the parties' agreements on the presentation
of evidence and called for a two-case approach to the presentation of evidence, with the
prosecution going first. The court's decision also allowed for cross-examination (called
"subsequent questioning"). Ruben Karemaker, et al, Witness Proofing in International Criminal
Ti bunals: Response to Ambos, 21 Leiden J Intl L 917, 918 n 7 (2008); see also Prosecutorv Lubanga,
Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-1084, Decision on the Status Before the Trial Chamber of the
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adversarial systems, the prosecution and defense will each be presenting
affirmative cases, with opportunities for cross-examination by the opposing
party. Ultimately, however, as in inquisitorial countries, the court will retain
control over the conduct of proceedings-regularly questioning the witnesses,
calling for further evidence, and summoning additional witnesses as necessary. 9°
Because judges at international criminal courts have a duty to give a thorough
reasoned judgment on the facts and the law, which is fully reviewable on appeal,
they have a strong incentive to play an active role in examining the evidence at
trial.9 In the overall effort to determine the truth, judges may regularly intervene
to bring out facts that the parties have neglected.
Another feature of international criminal procedure also confirms the
judges' central responsibility as guardians of an accurate record. When the
parties attempt to resolve a case consensually, judges are not bound by the
parties' agreement about the charges, the facts, or the sentence. Instead, judges
are expected to review carefully the validity of the defendant's admission of guilt,
including its factual basis. If additional fact-finding is necessary or if the interests
of justice so require, the court may call for further presentation of evidence or
reject the admission of guilt altogether.92 Even when the parties attempt to
dispose consensually of certain charges before indictment, judges may be able to
change the legal characterization of the facts to include new and more serious
charges.9 3 At the ICTY and ICTR, judges have already rejected several plea
agreements and guilty pleas as unsupported by the facts or inconsistent with the
interests of justice.94
The inquisitorial tradition has also left a mark on the ethical rules of
international criminal courts, particularly the ICC. The Codes of Conduct for the
ICTY and ICTR were heavily influenced by a detailed proposal of the American
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Evidence Heard by the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Trial
Proceedings, and the Manner in Which Evidence Shall Be Submitted,
1-2, 4 (Dec 13, 2007). A
perusal of the transcripts indicates, however, that judges were quite active in questioning
witnesses.
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in InternationalCriminalLaw at 143 (cited in note 12). Over the last several
years, the ICTY and ICTR have also moved from a more adversarial to a more inquisitorial model
of judicial control over the proceedings. See, for example, id; Ambos, 3 Intl Crim L Rev at 18-19
(cited in note 78); Kress, 1 J Intl Crim Just at 612 (cited in note 79).
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Kress, 1 J Ind Crim Just at 612 (cited in note 79).
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ICC Statute, Art 65(4).
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See, for example, Prosecutorv Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-2049, Decision Giving Notice
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Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, 4 (July 14, 2009).
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Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea BaqainingAcross Borders 234-35 (Aspen 2009). Such rejections are
even more likely to occur at the ICC, given that its procedures are less hospitable to plea
bargaining.
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Bar Association and thus reflect primarily an adversarial influence. But like the
procedural rules of these courts, ethical rules have over time been influenced by
inquisitorial approaches.9 5 The Code of Conduct for the ICC reflects
inquisitorial influences even more clearly, because its drafters received input
from a more6 diverse group of bar associations and non-governmental
organizations.

For example, the ICC Code of Conduct, echoing French ethical rules,
requires attorneys to take a "solemn undertaking" that they will perform their
duties with "integrity and diligence, honourably, freely, independently,
expeditiously, and conscientiously."97 None of its provisions explicitly urges or
requires lawyers to act zealously or aggressively in representing clients.
Other ethical guidelines, grounded in the ICC Rules of Procedure rather
than the Code of Conduct, have also been interpreted in a manner more closely
associated with inquisitorial systems. For example, two ICC Chambers have
interpreted a gap in the rules of procedure to mean that the preparation of
witnesses before testifying ("witness proofing") is not a permissible practice at
the ICC because it may interfere with the court's truth-seeking function.9 8 The
practice is generally accepted in adversarial systems, but typically banned in
inquisitorial systems.99

95

96

For example, the ICTY and ICTR have become more willing to impose counsel on accused,
contrary to their earlier approach, which reflected the adversarial position and gave defendants
broad rights to self-representation. They have also interpreted the client's autonomy to make
decisions about his representation more narrowly than adversarial jurisdictions. See, for example,
Prosecutor v Blagojevi, Case No IT-02-60-T, Decision on Independent Counsel for Vidoje
Blagojevi6's Motion to Instruct the Registrar to Appoint New Lead and Co-Counsel,
104-07
(July 3, 2003). Finally, certain ICTR decisions have interpreted the duty of confidentiality along
inquisitorial lines. Tuinstra, Defence Counselin InternationalCriminalLaw at 210-12 (cited in note 12).
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in International CriminalLaw at 197 (cited in note 12); Martha Walsh, The
InternationalBar Association Proposalfora Code of ProfessionalConductfor Counsel Before the ICC, I J Intl
Crim Just 490, 491, 496 (2003).

97

ICC Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel ("ICC Code of Profl Conduct"), Art 5, UN Doc
ICC-ASP/4/Res.1 (Dec 2, 2005).

98

Prosecutor v Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision on the Practices of Witness
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, 9-22 (Nov 8, 2006); Prosecutor v Lubanga, Case No ICC01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses
for Giving Testimony at Trial,
28-29, 57 (Nov 30, 2007). For a stimulating debate on the
merits of these decisions, compare generally, Ruben Karemaker, et al, Witness Proofing in
InternationalCriminal Tribunals:A CriticalAnaysis of Widening ProceduralDivergence, 21 Leiden J Intl L
683 (2008), with Kai Ambos, 'Witness Proofing' Before the International Criminal Court. A Reply to
Karemaker,Taylor, and Pittman,21 Leiden J Intl L 911 (2008).

99

The practice is permitted and well-accepted in the US. See Peter A. Joy and Kevin C. McMunigal,
Witness Preparation: When Does It Cross the Line?, 17 ABA Crim Just 48, 48 (2002). In Australia,
lawyers are permitted to prepare, but not "coach" witnesses. Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law: Lauyers'
Responsibility and Accountabiliy in Australia 559-60 §§ 15.1-15.2 (Butterworths 4th ed 2005). In
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Another indication that defense attorneys appearing before the ICC will
follow ethical guidelines that combine adversarial and inquisitorial elements is
the Code of Conduct drafted by the International Criminal Bar (ICB). The ICB
is an independent professional organization that represents defense attorneys
practicing before the ICC. About half of the current attorneys assigned to cases
before the ICC are also members of the ICB. The ICB developed a Code of
Conduct and submitted it for consideration to the ICC during the drafting
process of the ICC Code of Conduct. The ICB Code was therefore one of the
sources influencing the deliberations of the drafters of the ICC Code. It reflects
the views of a diverse group of international criminal defense attorneys,
representing all five continents and all major legal systems.'0 0
Like the final ICC Code, the ICB Code includes features that are arguably
less adversarial and more inquisitorial. First, it does not mention a requirement
of zealousness by attorneys, but instead emphasizes independence, honesty and
integrity, and competence.1' It does not adopt a posture of moral nonaccountability for defense attorneys. Instead, in a provision referring to the
attorney's role as counselor, the ICB Code notes that "[i]n rendering advice [to
the client], counsel may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, reputational, economic, social, and political factors that may be relevant
to the client's situation."' 0' The Code also adopts a less adversarial posture with
respect to counsel's balancing of duties to the client and to the court. It provides
that counsel "may refuse to offer evidence that counsel reasonably believes is
false, irrelevant, or lacks probative value" and that counsel "shall not ask a
question of a witness or make a statement of fact to the court without a good
faith basis for the question or statement."'0 3 Although these provisions were
ultimately not adopted by the ICC, they reflect the understanding of a

England and Wales, solicitors are also permitted to prepare, but not coach witnesses; barristers
are only allowed to familiarize witnesses with the courtroom and with the role of trial participants.
R v Momodou, [2005] 2 All ER 571,
61-62; Section 3: Written Standardsfor the Conduct of Professional
Work, Standard 6.3.1, in Bar Standards Board, Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales
(Bar Council of England and Wales 8th ed 2004) ("[it is wholly inappropriate for a barrister
in ... a [criminal] case to interview any potential witness. Interviewing includes discussing with
any such witness the substance of his evidence or the evidence of other such witnesses . . .);
Anthony Thornton, The ProfessionalResponsibiliy and Ethics of the English Bar, in Ross Cranston ed,
Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibiliy 53, 85 (Clarendon 1995) (noting that an English solicitor
may "interview all witnesses subject to rules prohibiting coaching").
100 International Criminal Bar, Word of Welcome from the Presidents, online at http://www.bpiicb.org (visited Nov 21, 2009).
101 International Criminal Bar, Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedure, Arts 3-5 (2003).
102
103

Id, Art 28.
Id, Arts 49(2), 51(3).
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substantial number of international criminal defense attorneys from different
traditions and are therefore worthy of consideration.
Perhaps because it attempted to reconcile diverse ethical and legal
traditions, the ICC Code of Conduct itself remains inconclusive or altogether
silent on a number of important ethical questions, including client perjury, selfrepresentation, division of authority between client and lawyer, and the
impeachment of truthful witnesses. As discussed in Sections III and IV, the
Code would benefit from a commentary that provides guidance on these
questions in a way that accommodates both the inquisitorial and adversarial
traditions, as well as the unique goals of international criminal law.
C. Other Comparisons Between Domestic and International
Criminal Defense
Across jurisdictions, legal ethics rules and commentaries tend to treat
criminal defense as a special category that demands distinct regulation. Many
scholars have argued that aggressive advocacy is more easily justified in the
criminal than in the civil context.' At least in the US, legal ethics rules also
reflect that position.0 5
Most arguments for aggressive advocacy in criminal cases focus on the
potential abuse of power by the state and the concern to avoid an unjust
conviction.' ° 6 According to many proponents of this position, the greater the
disparities of power and resources between the prosecution and the defense, the
greater the need for zealous representation. Commentators have pointed to two
other reasons for aggressive defense in the American context. One is that
zealous representation in criminal cases must be encouraged, because the reality
is far from this ideal. Many American criminal defense attorneys are so
overworked that they struggle to provide even adequate representation, much
less aggressive representation. Defendants become part of an "assembly line" in
which their cases are processed with a fraction of the effort that the rules, case
law, and textbooks envision. Instead of reminding attorneys of the limits to
aggressiveness, the reasoning goes, the rules and guidelines should be pushing
See, for example, Luban, 91 Mich L Rev at 1730 (cited in note 1); Barbara Allen Babcock,
Defending the Guily, 32 Cleve St L Rev 175, 177-78 (1983-84). But see Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at
1703 (cited in note 1) (disagreeing with the prevailing view that criminal defense should be treated
differently).
105 For example, the Model Rules give criminal defense attorneys greater leeway to make meridess
104

claims or contentions and to introduce evidence (specifically the defendant's testimony) that they
reasonably believe is false. MRPC R 3.1, 3.3 (cited in note 1).
106

See, for example, Luban, 91 Mich L Rev at 1730 (cited in note 1) ("Power-holders are inevitably
tempted to abuse the criminal justice system to persecute political opponents, and overzealous
police will trample civil liberties in the name of crime prevention and order.").
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them to be more zealous. °7 A second argument is that particularly aggressive
approaches to defense, even for guilty clients, are justified by the potential for
unduly harsh punishments.0 8
I do not propose to address the merits of these arguments in the domestic
system. Instead, this Section examines the extent to which these justifications
apply at the international level.
1. "Assembly-Line" Representation
While the inadequacy of much defense representation has been a persistent
theme for observers of the American criminal justice system, the same is not
generally true at the international level. In the US, criminal defense attorneys
rarely have the time and resources to conduct thorough investigations,0 9 and
some are not even able to discuss cases with their clients at any length.1 ' Some
commentators have described the situation as "assembly-line" representation.'
By contrast, at international courts, thorough investigation appears to be
much more common. Defense attorneys represent no more than a few
international clients at a time. They regularly discuss the case with their clients.
Virtually all international defense teams conduct investigations on the territory
where the crimes were committed." 2 The ICTY and ICTR provide the defense
with financial support and personnel for this purpose. Some attorneys continue
with their investigations even after exhausting the resources provided by the
tribunals. 113 Defense attorneys also typically hire one or more expert witnesses in
each of their cases."' They ordinarily conduct thorough cross-examinations of

107

Id at 1764.

108

Babcock, 32 Cleve St L Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 104); Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at 1722-28
(cited in note 1).
Data on New York City defense attorneys from the late 1980s showed that they hired experts in

109

only 2 percent of felony cases (the rate rose to 17 percent in homicide cases) and interviewed
witnesses in less than 5 percent of non-homicide felonies (the rate rose to roughly 20 percent in

homicide cases). Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuray in Criminal
Adjudicaion, 93 Cal L Rev 1585, 1602-03 (2005). A study of Phoenix attorneys found that only 55
percent of them visited the crime scene before a felony trial. Luban, 91 Mich L Rev at 1734-35
(cited in note 1).
110 Luban, 91 Mich L Rev at 1734 (cited in note 1).
Ml Id at 1748.
112

113
114

Turner, 48 Va J Ind L at 554 (cited in note 13) (reporting results from survey of forty-four
defense attorneys at the ICTY and ICTR).
Id at 555.
The ICTY and ICTR provide the defense with financial support for at least one investigator and
approximately 150 hours of expert pay per case. See John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence
Counsel at the ICTY, in Richard May, et al, eds, Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 167, 174 (Kluwer Law 2001) (observing that defense teams typically have
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prosecution witnesses, even when they have little experience in this skill because
of their inquisitorial background." 5 And courts are routinely subject to a barrage
of motions filed by defense attorneys both before and during trial, even to the
point of drawing criticism from irritated judges." 6
In short, disengaged, "assembly-line" representation does not appear to be
the problem at international tribunals that many believe it to be in domestic
criminal justice systems." 7 Of course, the possibility always remains that
individual defense attorneys will fail to pursue a given case with zeal and
dedication. But from a systemic perspective, it is probably fair to say that
international criminal defense attorneys are less in need of external
encouragement to represent clients vigorously than the majority of their
domestic counterparts.
2. Disproportionately Harsh Punishments
A second argument made by many lawyers and commentators in favor of
aggressive tactics is that such methods are justified to protest the severe
punishments that await many defendants in American criminal cases." 8 This
motivates defense attorneys in the US in death-penalty cases, but also in cases

115

one legal assistant and one investigator); Sylvia de Bertodano, What Price Defence? Resourcing the
Defence at the ICTY, 2 J Intl Crim Just 503, 504 (2004) (observing that the ICTY now provides, as a
matter of course, for up to three legal assistants and investigators); Michael G. Karnavas, Gathering
Evidence in International Criminal Trials-The View of the Defence Layer, in Michael Bohlander, ed,
InternationalCriminalJustice:A CriicalAnalysisof Institutions and Procedures 75, 96 n 64 (Cameron May
2007) (commenting that expert pay is limited to 150 hours per case on average); Christian Rohde,
Legal Aid & Defence Counsel Matters, in Rodney Dixon and Karim A.A. Khan, eds, Arcbbold
InternationalCriminal Courts. Practice,Procedure and Evidence 543, 592 (Sweet & Maxwell 2003) (noting
that an individual expert's working hours, not including court testimony, will typically be limited
to between five and thirty hours); Rohde, Legal Aid & Defence Counsel Matters at 566 (noting that
defense teams have hired a wide variety of experts, most notably military and medical experts).
See Turner, 48 Va J Intl L at 568-70 (cited in note 13) (reporting that many ICTY and ICTR

116

attorneys opt for aggressive cross-examination of witnesses). In the first trial before the ICC,
defense attorneys coming from inquisitorial countries also performed well in cross-examining and
impeaching prosecution witnesses. See Meribeth Deen, TestimonialInconsistencies Common in Criminal
Trials (Apr 2, 2009), online at http://www.lubangatrial.org/2009/04/02/testimonialinconsistencies-common-in-criminal-trials (visited Nov 21, 2009).
See Sonja B. Starr, EnsuringDfense Counsel Competence at InternationalCriminalTribunals, UCLA J Intl

117

L & Foreign Aff *1 n 6 (forthcoming 2009) (draft on file with author) (citing cases where irritated
judges chastised counsel for filing frivolous motions).
Some commentators have expressed concern about the lack of competence of international
criminal defense attorneys, but this is a separate matter. Lack of competence is best addressed
through better training and more discriminating admission procedures, rather than through rules
urging more aggressive defense. See id at Section II.A. Indeed, aggressive defense is likely to be
even more harmful when practiced by incompetent attorneys.
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Babcock, 32 Cleve St L Rev at 178-79 (cited in note 104); Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at 1722-28
(cited in note 1).
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involving harsh mandatory-minimum or "three-strikes" sentencing laws. At the
international criminal level, this justification does not apply. Indeed, sentences at
international criminal courts are more likely to be criticized for their leniency
than for their undue severity.
International courts cannot impose the death penalty and are not bound by
harsh mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines, or recidivist enhancements.
Some have called ICTY sentences imposed to date "inexplicably lenient" when
compared to punishments meted out for violent offenses in domestic courts, as
well as at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. 9 Even the ICTR, which has
consistently imposed life imprisonment in genocide cases, has been criticized for
being too forgiving relative to local Rwandan courts, which until recently
regularly imposed the death penalty for genocide. 20 Over the last few years,
sentences at the ICTR and ICTY have decreased even further as a result of the
rise of plea bargaining.
The ICC also appears unlikely to be particularly punitive compared to
other courts adjudicating cases of murder, rape, and other serious war crimes.
Although it is supposed to adjudicate only cases of extreme gravity, its founding
statute limits prison terms to thirty years, unless a life sentence is "justified by
the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the
convicted person.''. Again, the death penalty is not available.
3. The Strength of the Prosecutorial Advantage
One of the most frequent arguments for permitting aggressive defense
tactics in domestic trials is the perception that prosecutors enjoy significant
advantages over defendants, both with respect to certain pre-trial procedures
and with respect to financial and investigative resources. Closely related to these
concerns is the ever-present potential for abuse of prosecutorial powers. While
in some respects, the strength of the prosecution's advantages might appear to
be less pronounced in international courts, a more careful assessment indicates
that the picture is mixed. Although it is probably true that international
prosecutors usually hold less procedural leverage than prosecutors in American
courts, the imbalance of resources appears to persist in both systems.

119 Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, The Sentencing Practice of International Criminal Tribunals:
Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinay Crimes, 5 J Intl Crim Just 683, 684-89 (2007); see also Steven
Glickman, Note, Victims'Justice:Legitimijng the Sentencing Regime of the InternationalCriminalCourt, 43
Colum J Transnatl L 229, 247-50 (2004) (discussing ICTY sentences and concluding that they
have been too lenient to achieve the retributive goals of the tribunal).
120
See Paul Roberts and Nesam McMillan, For Criminology in InternationalCriminalJustice, 1J Ind Crim

Just 315, 332 (2003).
121

ICC Statute, Art 77(1).
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Professor Abe Goldstein wrote about the "balance of advantage" in
American criminal procedure. 122 The prosecution must of course carry its
burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and it must do so based on
admissible evidence. But in other respects, the prosecution enjoys significant
procedural advantages over the defense. Among the features most commonly
noted in the American context are the prosecution's ability to overcharge and
plea bargain to obtain concessions; the very limited discovery rights of criminal
defendants; the government's ability to search and seize the defendant's
property; and the use of immunity to obtain information from potential
accomplices. 123 While many of these features also exist to a greater or lesser
degree at the international level, the procedural playing field in international
courts appears to tilt somewhat less strongly in the prosecution's favor-in at
least a couple of significant respects.
First, compared to their American counterparts, ICC prosecutors have
narrower charging and bargaining discretion and less leverage over defendants in
plea negotiations. An ICC prosecutor may freely amend or withdraw charges
only up to the point of presenting the indictment to the Pre-Trial Chamber for
confirmation. Because of the careful scrutiny of the charges by the Pre-Trial
Chamber, prosecutors are limited in the extent to which they can "overcharge" a
defendant to gain bargaining leverage. After the confirmation hearing,
prosecutorial discretion to bargain about charges is also quite restricted, because
the court must approve any amendments to the charges.124 Prosecutors are
constrained in their ability to bargain about sentencing as well. International
judges are not bound by any plea agreements between the parties, and at least at
the ICTY and ICTR, they have rejected several agreements as inconsistent with
the interests of justice. At the ICC, plea agreements may face even more
resistance. Even if a defendant admits guilt, ICC judges may call for further
investigation in the case if they believe that further fact-finding is necessary to
help them decide whether to accept an admission of guilt or a plea agreement.121
Second, international prosecutors are generally less well equipped than
their domestic counterparts to gather evidence. They must rely on the
cooperation of state authorities, who are frequently unwilling or unable to

122
123

Abraham Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in CriminalProcedure, 69 Yale L J
1149, 1149-50 (1960).
Luban, 91 Mich L Rev at 1736-40 (cited in note 1).

124

After the confirmation hearing and before trial, the prosecutor can amend charges only with
permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Once the trial begins, the prosecutor may no longer amend
the charges, but may withdraw them only with the consent of the Trial Chamber. ICC Statute, Art
61(9).
125 Id, Art 65.
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provide it. Sometimes states are positively hostile to the efforts of international
prosecutors and their investigators.'2 6 Even when prosecutors do have access to
the evidence, they are under a mandate to gather both incriminating and
exonerating evidence-which is not so in the American system.' 27 ICC
prosecutors must also disclose both incriminating and exonerating evidence to
128
the defense before trial, most of it at the time the indictment is confirmed.
These stringent disclosure obligations further reduce the power disparities
between the prosecution and the defense.
At the same time, the imbalance of financial and investigative resources
between prosecution and defense appears to exist in international courts much
as it does in domestic courts. International prosecutors ordinarily have
significant financial advantages over international defense attorneys. The overall
budget allotted to the defense at international courts is only about one-third of
that allotted to the prosecution. 2 9 This budget is for defense attorneys
appointed to represent indigent defendants. So far, the vast majority of
international defendants have qualified for such support. 30 Still, as a result of

126

127

128

129

130

Sudan, for example, has detained and prosecuted persons suspected of cooperating with ICC
prosecutors. International Federation for Human Rights, Serious Concerns About HarassmentFaced by
PersonsSusected of Supporing or Cooperatingwith the InternationalCriminalCourt in Sudan (Feb 2, 2009),
online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49885789c.html (visited Nov 21, 2009). For a
long time, officials in the former Yugoslavia also tried to obstruct the work of ICTY prosecutors.
Consider Carla del Ponte, Madame Prosecutor Confrontations with Humanio's Worst Ciminals and the
Culture of Impunity 53, 56-57 (Other 2008). Because the ICC is supposed to take cases only when
local authorities are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute, this can be expected to be a
continuing problem.
We have yet to see how scrupulously ICC prosecutors will fulfill this mandate. In domestic
inquisitorial systems, the duty to gather exculpatory evidence has not always been followed
rigorously in practice. See note 46 and accompanying text.
ICC judges have already used their powers to rein in prosecutors when the latter were attempting
to evade their disclosure obligations. Prosecutorv Lubanga, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on
the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 1 (uly 2, 2008).
David Wippman, The Costs of InternationalProsecution, 100 Am J Intl L 861, 872 (2006) (discussing
the ICTY budget). In some American jurisdictions, for example, the disparity is reportedly closer
to one-eighth. Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, The Rsght to Counsel in CriminalCases, A National
Crisis, 57 Hastings LJ 1031, 1045 n 60 (2006). But see ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid &
Indigent Justice, Gideon's Broken Promise:America's ContinuingQuestfor EqualJusice 13-14, online at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise
(visited Nov 21, 2009)
(noting that at the federal level, the disparity is closer to the one-third allotted to the defense in
international courts: the prosecution receives twice the funding that the defense does, but this
does not include "the amounts that are spent by police, forensic labs, and so forth that are not
directly part of the prosecutor's office").
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in InternationalCriminalLaw at 30, 30 n 161 (cited in note 12).
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the funding disparities, prosecutorial teams are generally better staffed and better
supported than defense teams during both the investigation and trial.'
International prosecutors also enjoy important investigative advantages
over the defense. Even more than their domestic counterparts, international
criminal defense attorneys encounter great obstacles in procuring evidence and
witnesses.'32 They must rely on state authorities for cooperation, and such
cooperation is rarely forthcoming.'33 When defense attorneys turn to
international courts for support, those courts are often unable to assist them in
securing state cooperation.134 Again, international prosecutors are also relatively
3
weak in their investigative capacities compared to their domestic counterparts. 1
But in most cases, they will be able to rely on the backing of the international
community and international criminal courts in their investigations. Such
support is unlikely to be given to defense attorneys.
It may be, therefore, that the prosecution's relative advantages in
international and domestic courts do not argue strongly for a difference in the
ethical guidelines applicable to defense attorneys working in the two systems.
But the other factors discussed above-the broader goals served by international
criminal courts, the inquisitorial features of these courts, the relative absence of a
need to exhort international attorneys to practice more aggressively, and the
relatively milder sentences imposed by international tribunals--do weigh in
favor of a different approach to the ethical practices of defense attorneys. In the
following Section, I address four areas in which I believe these features of
international criminal defense call for a distinct approach to ethics, and one that

134

The typical ICTY prosecution trial team consists of three attorneys, one legal officer, and five
support staffers. Wippman, 100 Am J Intl L at 870 (cited in note 129). In addition, the
prosecution can rely on the services of a corps of investigators working for the international
tribunals. By contrast, the defense team typically consists of two attorneys and up to three legal
assistants and investigators. Id at 871. A certain balance of advantages in favor of the prosecution,
of course, can be justified by the fact that the prosecution bears a high burden of proof. At the
ICC, the prosecution also has the obligation to investigate exculpatory, as well as inculpatory
evidence.
See, for example, Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficu/ties and
Proipects, 27 Yale J Intl L 111, 131 (2002); Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal
Procedure:Due ProcessAspiraions and Limitations,45 Colum J Transnatl L 635, 676-80 (2006).
As one international defense attorney commented, "[w]hen entering a State that is the subjectmatter of a trial, the defence lawyer will be regarded as being on the side of an enemy and will be
at risk of obstruction, threats, and physical abuse ....
The defence lawyer does not have the
international accreditation of the Prosecuro, .... " Steven Kay, QC and Bert Swart, The Role of the
Defence, in Cassese, et al, 2 Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court: A Commentary at 1424
(cited in note 15).
See Cogan, 27 Yale J Intl L at 131 (cited in note 132); Gordon, 45 Colum J Transnal L at 676-80
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(cited in note 132).
See note 126 and accompanying text.
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would be best implemented by a commentary to existing Code of Conduct
provisions.
III. FOUR ETHICAL DILEMMAS FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
Criminal defense attorneys encounter a host of situations in which their
duty to clients appears to be pitted against their duties to the court and to the
legal system. In the international context, serving the client aggressively-"doing
anything arguably legal to advance the client's ends"36-may at times interfere
with important goals of international criminal trials, such as truth-seeking and
restoring victims' dignity. At the same time, privileging objectives other than
zealous representation may seem to many defense attorneys to be inconsistent
with the attorney's duties to the client and, in some cases, with the client's
procedural rights. This Section reviews four ethical dilemmas that present
competing ethical obligations and offers tentative conclusions about the ethical
standards that should apply in light of the unique features and goals of
international criminal trials.
A. Impeaching Truthful Witnesses
Imagine the following two scenarios. The first is a hypothetical discussed
frequently in domestic legal ethics commentaries, and the second is more
specifically targeted to international criminal proceedings:
1. The client has confided to his lawyer that he was present at a certain
place at a certain time, and a prosecution witness has just stated that
she saw the witness at that same place at the relevant time. However,
the witness is an older woman who wears glasses, and the lawyer might
try to impeach her on the ground that she has poor vision. 137 Should
the lawyer do so, even though he knows that the witness is telling the
truth?
2. Witness A is testifying that he was forcibly abducted to fight for the
defendant's rebel group when he was a child. 138 The defendant's lawyer
knows from talking with his client that the witness is telling the truth.
Should the attorney cross-examine the witness so as to suggest to the
court that the witness in fact joined the rebel group voluntarily?

136

Simon, 91 Mich L Rev at 1703 (cited in note 1).

137

Id at 1706.

138

Under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the ICC Statute, it is a crime to conscript or enlist children under 15
years and use them to participate actively in the hostilities. ICC Statute, Art 8(2)(b)(xxvi).

Winter 2010

Chicago Journalof InternaiionalLaw

The stricter view of zealous advocacy suggests that a lawyer should impeach the
witnesses in the above scenarios if the lawyer believes it would help the client's
case. But such impeachment arguably interferes with the court's pursuit of truth
and, in the second scenario above, may also unduly embarrass or burden the
victim-witness. The question is how international courts should approach this
potential ethical conflict.
The ICC Code of Conduct, like many domestic legal ethics rules,
emphasizes the lawyer's duty not to mislead the court. 3 9 Article 24(3) of the ICC
Code of Conduct provides that counsel "shall not deceive or knowingly mislead
the Court." Article 25(1) further requires that counsel "at all times maintain the
integrity of evidence, whether in written, oral or any other form, which is
submitted to the Court. He or she shall not introduce evidence which he or she
knows to be incorrect." The ICB's proposed Code of Conduct seemed to go
even further, stating that "[c]ounsel shall not ask a question of a witness or make
a statement of fact to the court without a good faith basis for the question or
140
statement."'
Still, none of these provisions appears to squarely address the question of
whether a defense attorney may attempt to cast doubt on testimony that the
attorney knows to be truthful. A very broad reading of the ICC provisions might
be construed as prohibiting the practice, under the theory that impeachment of
truthful witnesses amounts to misleading the court. But this interpretation would
seem unlikely. There is a difference between affirmative presentation of evidence
that an attorney knows to be false and questioning of testimony that is presented
by another (even if the lawyer knows the testimony to be truthful). The ICB's
proposed provision would have come closer to addressing the issue directly. But
even it does not explain what it means by the statement that counsel must have a
good-faith basis for asking a question. Even if a defense lawyer knows that a
witness is truthful, the lawyer could still argue that she has a good-faith basis for
asking a question because of her duty to test the prosecution's evidence.
Moreover, the ICB's proposed provision was not adopted by the court.
Adversarial procedural systems generally allow counsel to impeach truthful
witnesses. In the US, for example, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state
that "[d]efense counsel's belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth

139

140

French and German lawyers also may not knowingly mislead the court. See, for example, Ader
and Damien, R-gks de la Profession d'Avocat at % 31.41, 33.41 (cited in note 49). But neither French
nor German ethics rules specifically address the question of impeaching truthful witnesses, and
this question has given rise to a vigorous debate in the German literature.
International Criminal Bar, Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedure, Art 51(3) (2003).
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does not preclude cross-examination.'. 14' Courts have also held that "[v]igorous
advocacy by defense counsel may properly entail impeaching or confusing a
witness, even if counsel thinks the witness is truthful."' 42 In adversarial systems,
the defense's primary role is to test the prosecution's case. From an ethical
perspective, therefore, it does not matter whether counsel believes or knows that
an adverse witness is telling the truth. The court or the jury is charged with
finding the truth, and counsel would be usurping this fact-finding role if he or
143
she fails to challenge testimony that the jury might reasonably doubt.
Moreover, it is always possible (at least in theory) that the attorney's own
information is inaccurate and that the client is confused, has forgotten, or is
falsely admitting guilt-for example, because he wants to protect a third party
from responsibility.
More fundamentally, adversarial systems view vigorous cross-examination
as the best guarantee that innocent persons will not be convicted and the truth
will ultimately emerge. It is up to the prosecution to try to repair the witness's
credibility if the witness is confused by rigorous cross-examination. And it is

141

142

143

American Bar Association, ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice: Proseculion and Defense Function % 47.6(b) (1993). It should be noted, however, that counsel would not be disciplined for failing to
impeach a truthful adverse witness. As the Commentary to the ABA Standards states, "the mere
fact that defense counsel can, by use of impeachment, impair or destroy the credibility of an
adverse witness does not impose on counsel a duty to do so." Id, § 4-7.6(b) cmt. Similarly, "ji]f
defense counsel can provide an effective defense for the accused and also avoid confusion or
embarrassment of the witness, counsel should seek to do so." Id. Although the Model Rules
generally ban tactics that "have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person," these limitations have not been interpreted to prevent the impeachment of truthful
witnesses. MRPC R 4.4(a) (cited in note 1); Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary
Advocay in a DemocraticAge 50 (Princeton 2008).
United States v Thoreen, 653 F2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir 1981); Markovits, A Modem Legal Ethics:
Adversay Advocay in a DemocraticAge at 50 n * (cited in note 141). Australian authorities have also
noted that "[t]here appears to be a good argument that the defence counsel in a criminal case may
cross-examine a witness he or she knows is telling the truth in order to discredit that witness
before the jury. It seems to be fair tactics . . . for counsel to test the prosecution's evidence and
have the prosecution prove its case. The defence counsel should be allowed to search for
weaknesses in the witness's character or testimony, even though it has no relationship to
accuracy." Ross, Ethics in Law: Layers' Responsibilily and Accountability in Australia at 555-56 §
14.1113 (cited in note 99). But there are limits on such cross-examination in Australia and in the
UK. Barristers may not suggest criminality, fraud, or other serious misconduct unless they have a
reasonable basis for their suggestions. Id at 556 § 14.114.
See, for example, Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversay Advocagy in a Democratic Age at 50
(cited in note 141) ("The lawyer who holds back [in impeaching a witness whom the lawyer
believes is testifying truthfully] abandons her advocate's role and usurps the factfinder by denying
it an independent opportunity to weigh credibility."); Blake and Ashworth, 7 Legal Ethics at 184
(cited in note 1) ("[Flacts are for the court to find, not for the lawyer to pre-empt.'"; Turner, 48
Va J Ind L at 569-70 (cited in note 13) (quoting international criminal defense attorneys who hold
this belief).
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ultimately the court's duty to decide if the witness is credible. It would be
inappropriate for the attorney to preempt that decision.
Inquisitorial systems tend to approach this question differently. As
discussed earlier, they neither call for zealous advocacy by defense counsel nor
authorize the impeachment of truthful witnesses. Many German commentators
believe that an attorney's duty to the truth precludes such impeachment.'" Some
authorities link this duty to the lawyers' broader role as organs of the
administration of justice, 145 which in the case of impeachment of truthful
witnesses is said to trump the lawyers' duty of loyalty to their clients.
As a practical matter, the question of impeaching truthful witnesses does
not arise as frequently in inquisitorial settings. 146 Witnesses are called by the
court, and the court takes an active role in their examination. The opportunities
for cross-examination by the parties are generally more limited. More broadly,
this reflects the inquisitorial view that the best way to elicit truthful responses is
not through partisan examination, but through dispassionate inquiry by an
impartial judge.
The inquisitorial approach to impeachment of truthful witnesses is a
relevant reference point for international criminal courts. At the ICC, judges also
take an active role in questioning witnesses, who are viewed as witnesses of the
court, rather than of the parties.'1 While the parties still take the primary role in
examining witnesses, relative to adversarial proceedings, the proceedings at the
144 Compare Luban, 48 RabelsZ at 267 (cited in note 62) (noting that in Germany, a lawyer "may not
contradict his opponent's statements if he knows them to be true, even in order to help his client
to a just victory"); Gerd Pfeiffer, Zuldssiges und Unulssiges Verteidigerhandeln, 9 Deutsche
Richterzeitung 341, 346 (1984); Wilhelm Krekeler, Strafrechtliche GrenZen der Verteidigung, 4 Neue
Zeitschrift ffir Strafrecht 146, 152 (1989) with Anabel Harting, Berufspflichten des Strafverteidigers und
Sankionierung Pflichtwidrigen Verhaltens 156 (Deutscher Anwaltverlag 2008). See also Hans Dahs,
Handbuch des Strafverteidigers 53-54 Rn 75 (Otto Schmidt 7th ed 2005) (noting that when an
attorney knows that the witness is telling the truth on a particular point, the attorney should not
attempt to impeach the credibility of the witness; but adding that impeachment is allowed if the
witness is not telling the truth on a certain point, even if the lawyer knows that the gist of the
overall testimony-pointing to the defendant's guilt-is accurate).
145 This role is enshrined in Codes of Conduct, but because the Codes fail to specify the precise
consequences following from it, courts and scholars have stepped in to give it more definition.
See, for example, Werner Beulke, Der Verteidiger im Strafverfahren 200-01 (Metzner 1980) (noting
the tension between the lawyer's role as Organ der Rechtspflege and her duty to the client, and
advancing a theory that aims to accommodate both of these duties); Joachim Kretschmer, Der
Strafrechtl'che Parteiverrat 76 (Nomos 2005) (citing to court decisions making the connection
between the duty as Organ der Rechtspflege and the duty to the truth). Other German commentators
have linked the duty to the truth in different principles of criminal procedure, such as the
principle of fair trial. See, for example, Wilftied Bottke, Wahrheitrpflict des Verteidigers, 96 Zeitschrift
fur die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 726, 752-53 (1984).
146
147

See Hazard and Dondi, Legal Ethics:A ComparativeStudy at 67 (cited in note 53).
Ambos, 3 nd Crim L Rev at 19-20 (cited in note 78).
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ICC are expected to be less partisan and more oriented toward the court's
neutral inquiry. Attempts by the defense to discredit truthful witnesses are likely
to be seen as less appropriate in this setting. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the
ethical rules of the ICC do not require zealous advocacy, but simply diligence,
integrity, and conscientiousness.' 4 8 Accordingly, lawyers do not appear to have
an independent duty to press for every advantage of their client, particularly
when doing so may interfere with the court's pursuit of the truth.
Nor do the distinctive goals of international criminal law particularly
support aggressive cross-examination of witnesses whom a lawyer believes to be
truthful. On the one hand, the goal of providing a fair trial-and related
procedural rights such as the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the right to confront witnesses-can be interpreted to
demand nothing less than the aggressive examination of all witnesses for the
prosecution, even those that a defense attorney knows to be tclling the truth,
provided the attorney believes the tactic will be effective. 4 9
But this must be weighed against other goals. Creation of an accurate
historical record, for example, would tend to disfavor impeachment of
witnesses. Such impeachment risks muddling the record, opening doors for
revisionist accounts, and preventing future generations from ever coming to
know the true facts of the crimes committed.
In addition, when the impeached witness is also a victim of a violent crime
or a relative of a victim, the attempt to discredit his or her testimony would
interfere with the goal of providing victims with a sense of closure following
great trauma or loss. Pointed challenges to the victims' accounts of the crime can
"exacerbate their loneliness, alienation, confusion about what happened, and
sense that they might be responsible for the horrors that befell them."1 5 Instead
of achieving closure, it is possible that victim witnesses may be forced to deal
with additional anxiety resulting from attempts to undermine their credibility. 51
If victims who have suffered unspeakable horrors---even those whom the
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ICC Code of Profl Conduct, Art 5.

149

See, for example, Ross, Ethics in Law: Lawyers' Responsibiliy andAccountabilioy in Australia at 555-56 §
14.113 (cited in note 99) (noting that such tactics may be necessary to implement the attorney's
duty to test the prosecution's evidence and hold the prosecution to its burden of proof).

Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Pyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Consok Their
Victims?, 46 Harv Ind LJ 295, 334 (2005) (citations omitted).
151 See, for example, Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague 10, 57,
67, 129-30 (U Penn 2005); International Federation for Human Rights, Victims in the Balance:
Challenges Ahead for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 8, 14-15 (2002), online at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FIDHrwVictimsBalanceNov2003.pdf
(visited Nov 21,
2009); Binaifer Nowrojee, 'Your Justice Is Too Slow": Will the ICTR FailRwanda's Rape Victims?, UN
Research Inst for Soc Dev Occasional Paper 4, 10, 23 (2005).
150
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defense knows to be testifying truthfully-are to be subjected routinely to
unwarranted attacks on their own credibility, it would not be surprising to see
calls for a movement to more purely inquisitorial trials where judges do the
questioning.
Returning to the scenario presented at the outset of this Section, if ethical
rules were interpreted solely in light of the legalist adversarial model, the
attorney would certainly be allowed to cross-examine witness A so as to make it
appear that he joined the rebel group voluntarily. If the attorney believes that the
tactic would be effective, then under the stricter view of aggressive advocacy, the
attorney would be ethically bound to pursue this course.
But the tactic would come at considerable cost with respect to other
objectives of international trials. If the attorney actually manages to confuse
witness A on the stand and undermine his testimony that he was abducted by
the rebel group, this might prevent the court-as well as the public and possibly
history-from learning the full truth about the particular crimes committed.
Observers of the trial could be left with the inaccurate impression that children,
such as the witness, joined the defendant's rebel group voluntarily. This type of
impression would dilute the moral condemnation of the rebel group's use of
child soldiers and conflict with the court's mission to promote respect for
human rights, such as the right of children not to be enlisted to participate in
hostilities. Finally, the witness could be further traumatized by the experience of
2
testifying and having his honesty challenged.1
Although the rules are silent as to counsel's duties regarding the
impeachment of truthful witnesses, both the inquisitorial orientation of the ICC
procedural regime and several of the key goals of international criminal law
suggest that counsel should be guided to refrain from this practice. The ICC
ought to provide clearer guidance to lawyers for a more practical reason, tooto avoid inconsistent approaches to ethical questions before it. The guidance
should be consistent with the goals of international criminal law and, where
possible, should attempt to accommodate diverging domestic practices. A good
way to implement this approach would be to include a commentary that helps
lawyers interpret the ICC Code of Conduct. This would be easier than amending
the Code, and it is a common practice in national jurisdictions. It would have the
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The ICC Code of Conduct appears to reflect this special goal of international criminal law when it
prohibits counsel from subjecting witnesses to "disproportionate or unnecessary pressure within
or outside the courtroom." ICC Code of Profl Conduct, Art 29(1). The Code also exhorts
attorneys to have special consideration for "victims of torture or of physical, psychological or
sexual violence, or children, the elderly or the disabled." Id, Art 29(2). If a defense lawyer believes
that a witness is telling the truth, attempting to discredit the witness's testimony may be
considered a disproportionate tactic under the ICC Code, although this may be an overly
expansive interpretation of the Rules.
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benefit of giving lawyers some flexibility in their behavior, in recognition of the
diverse approaches used in different domestic jurisdictions, while steering them
toward conduct consistent with the overall goals of the international criminal
justice system.
It is surely the case that many international defense attorneys already
routinely decline to attempt impeachment of victim witnesses whom they know
to be telling the truth. Even setting aside the attorney's personal view of the
tactic, the attorney must consider how it will look to the judges. The odds that
the strategy will backfire and that the attorney will lose credibility and moral
standing in the eyes of the court (potentially harming the client's case) are
substantial. Yet attorneys who interpret their ethical obligations as requiring the
most aggressive tactics permitted under the law-and who cannot be certain that
such tactics would be ineffective in a particular case-may feel duty-bound to
pursue them. A clear indication from the court that impeachment of truthful
witnesses, while not absolutely prohibited, is neither required nor encouraged,
would help to address this concern.
When discussing the lawyer's duties to the court under Article 24(3) of the
ICC Code of Conduct and duties to witnesses under Article 29(1), the
commentary should specifically address obligations with respect to the
impeachment of truthful witnesses. It could include an explanation along the
following lines:
The lawyer's duty to his or her client does not require a lawyer to impeach
the credibility of a witness on a particular point of evidence, particularly
when the lawyer knows that the witness is testifying truthfully on that point.
The Court urges lawyers not to attempt to impeach a testifying victim on a
particular point of evidence when the lawyer knows that the witness is
telling the truth on that point.
The commentary would thus clarify the conduct that appears most consistent
with the goals of international criminal law. It would not impose an absolute
prohibition on the impeachment of truthful witnesses, or create sanctions for
noncompliant behavior, in recognition of the differing practices of adversarial
systems. But it would promote an ethical standard that is more consistent with
the structure and purposes of international courts than the aggressive adversarial
standard that a number of international criminal defense attorneys currently
employ.'53

153

In a survey of ICTY and ICTR defense attorneys which I conducted in 2006 and 2007, about half
of the respondents stated they would opt for impeaching truthful witnesses. Attorneys from
adversarial systems were more likely to do so than attorneys from inquisitorial systems. See note

251 and accompanying text.
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B. Responding to Potential Client Perjury
Another question that presents a potential ethical dilemma for international
criminal defense attorneys concerns the attorneys' response to a client's decision
to testify falsely. Consider the following scenario: At the first meeting between a
defense attorney and his client, the client tells the attorney that he has an alibi
for the time of the crime-he was at a party in another part of town. After the
lawyer investigates the alibi and finds no one to corroborate it, the client changes
his story and says that, in fact, he stayed late at work that day. The lawyer
follows up on this information, but again finds no corroborating evidence. The
defendant then states that he was at home during the time of the crime and that
his wife would support his testimony. He tells the attorney he intends to testify
to this effect at trial. When the lawyer asks the client whether the alibi is true, the
client refuses to answer directly, but simply says: "My wife will back it up."
Set aside, for the moment, strategic considerations as to whether such
testimony would in fact be useful. Is the defense attorney ethically compelled to
counsel his client not to give testimony that the attorney knows (or is virtually
certain) is false? Should he threaten to withdraw if the client insists on testifying?
The situation presents a tension between the lawyer's duty of candor to the
court and his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to the client. It also implicates
the defendant's right to testify on his own behalf.
Ethical rules at the ICC do not explicitly impose a duty on defense
attorneys to prevent their clients from testifying falsely. As noted earlier, Article
24(2) of the ICC Code of Conduct provides that "[c]ounsel is personally
responsible for the conduct and presentation of the client's case and shall
exercise personal judgement on the substance and purpose of statements made
and questions asked." But this provision is broadly worded and offers no
concrete guidance on the question of client perjury.' Article 24(3) provides that
counsel "shall not deceive or knowingly mislead the Court," but this also does not
explain how counsel should respond to a decision by the client to present false
testimony.1 5 Does the Article imply that a lawyer does not present or permit
testimony that the lawyer does not find credible? The rule is silent on this point.
The proposed ICB Code of Conduct provided, more concretely, that "[c]ounsel
may refuse to offer evidence that counsel reasonably believes is false, irrelevant,
or lacks probative value."' 56 But again, this provision was not adopted as part of
the ICC Code.
154 See

Human Rights First, Ensuring Ethical Representalion vi (Nov 2004), online
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/icc-ethics-report-120304.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
155 Id.
156

at

International Criminal Bar, Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedure, Art 49(2) (2003).
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The presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt would suggest that an attorney who merely believes, but does
not know, that the client would testify falsely has no obligation to intervene. If
the attorney merely suspects that the client's testimony would be untruthful, he
or she should generally resolve doubts and suspicions in favor of the client. This
is the position of the US Model Rules and of other adversarial system
authorities."5 7 At the same time, as the comments to the Model Rules affirm, the
lawyer "cannot ignore an obvious falsehood."' 58 Once the lawyer has a "firm
factual basis" or is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt" that a client will
testify falsely, 5 9 as an officer of the court, the lawyer must take action to prevent
the untruthful testimony or at least disassociate himself from it. 6 '
A few American state courts have been more solicitous of the defendant's
interest in testifying in his own defense. They have held that due process and the
right to counsel require an attorney to present his client as a witness, even when
counsel knows that the testimony will be false. 6 ' They consider the defendant's
ability to testify to be a critical element of his ability to present a meaningful
defense.62 Therefore, even if a lawyer believes that a client intends to testify
falsely, the lawyer should not prevent the client from exercising the right to
testify. According to this minority position, the lawyer is not supposed to be the
judge of the client's credibility in any circumstance whatsoever-this is for the

'57
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See, for example, R v Moore, [2002] 217 Sask R 259,
48-54 (discussing the rules in Canada);
Blake and Ashworth, 7 Legal Ethics at 174-76 (cited in note 1) (discussing the rules in England
and Wales).
MRPC R 3.3 cmt 8 (cited in note 1).

159 See Annotated MRPC R 3.3, Annotation: Knowledge 317 (ABA 6th ed 2007) (citing cases); see
also Nathan Crystal, False Testimony by CriminalDefendants: Still UnansweredEthical and Constitutional
,Questions, 2003 U Ill L Rev 1529, 1553-54 (discussing cases); Philip J. Grib, A Lanyer's Ethically
Justified "Cooperation" in Client Pejuy, 18 J Legal Prof 145, 167 (1993) ("Mere suspicion, belief,
possibility or even probability that [the client] would lie would not preclude putting him on the
stand.").
160 See MRPC R 3.3(a), 3.3(b) (cited in note 1). The lawyer must first try to persuade the client to
testify truthfully or not to testify. If that fails, the lawyer must withdraw. If withdrawal is not
practicable, in most jurisdictions, the lawyer must allow the accused to give evidence in narrative
form, without questions from the lawyer. If the lawyer acquires the knowledge after the client has
already testified, the lawyer must take "reasonable remedial measures": He must attempt to
persuade the client to retract the testimony, withdraw if this fails, and if withdrawal is not
permitted or "will not undo the effect of the false evidence," he must disclose the perjury to the
tribunal. MRPC R 3.3 cmts 1, 10 (cited in note 1).
161 MRPC R 3.3 cmt 7 (cited in note 1). The US Supreme Court, however, has held that the US
Constitution does not require criminal defense attorneys to allow clients to testify falsely. Nix v
Williams, 475 US 157, 173-74 (1986).
162 On the right "to present a complete defense" generally, see California v Trombetta, 467 US 479, 485
(1984); Crane vKentucky, 476 US 683, 690 (1986).
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jury or the court to determine.' 63 Proponents of this position argue further that
the duty of confidentiality prohibits lawyers from disclosing to the court that a
client intends to or has testified falsely.'
Inquisitorial systems also do not expect intervention by criminal defense
attorneys who know that their clients are about to testify falsely. This may
appear surprising, given these systems' professed commitment to the search for
the "objective" truth. But it can be explained by looking at inquisitorial
procedures for testimony by criminal defendants. To encourage defendants to
speak, inquisitorial systems allow defendants to give unsworn statements.
Indeed, in most inquisitorial systems, if criminal defendants do speak to the
court, their only option is to give an unsworn statement. 6 s Because defendants
face no penalty for giving a false statement, lawyers are also not expected to
discourage them from doing so. Lawyers may even tell their clients that they will
not be sanctioned for perjury if they make a false statement.' 66 Lawyers would
breach their duty to the court only if they go further and actually advise the
client to give untruthful statements.167 Apparently, some inquisitorial systems,
such as France, tend to tolerate even such conduct in practice.' 68
Reflecting this inquisitorial approach, the ICC also gives defendants the
right to make unsworn statements in their defense.'6 9 Unlike in inquisitorial
systems, defendants who choose to speak to the court are not obliged to do so
through an unsworn statement. They may also testify as ordinary witnesses by
giving "an undertaking as to the truthfulness of the evidence."' 170 Unsworn
statements have lower probative value (indeed, an alternative view is that they
have no probative value at all171), but a number of defendants may prefer to give
such statements because they could still present their position while not running
the risk of a perjury prosecution or a sentence enhancement for untruthful
163

See, for example, State v McDowel, 669 NW2d 204, 224 (Wis 2003) (stating that the attorney has a

164

duty to preserve his or her client's right to testify); Nix, 475 US at 189 (Blackmun concurring)
(citing United States ex rel Wilcox vJohnson, 555 F2d 115, 122 (3d Cir 1977)).
Freedman, 64 Mich L Rev at 1477-78 (cited in note 65).

165

Giuliano Turone, The Denialof the Accused's Right to Make Unsworn Statements in Delali, 2 J Intl Crim

166

Just 455, 455 (2004).
See, for example, Beulke, Der Verteidiger im Strafvefahren at 154 (cited in note 145); Bottke, 96
Zeitschrift for die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft at 756 (cited in note 145).
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See, for example, Beulke, Der Verteidiger im Strafverfahren at 154-55 (cited in note 145); Bottke, 96
Zeitschrift fOr die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft at 757-58 (cited in note 145).

168
169

Lerner, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 827 (cited in note 69).
ICC Statute, Art 67(1)(h).

170

Id, Art 69(1).

171 William A. Schabas, Artice 67: Rights of the Accused, in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commenta 7 on the Rome

Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt 1247, 1269 (Hart 2d ed 2008).
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testimony. Defense attorneys, particularly those from civil-law systems, may also
encourage defendants to give unsworn statements, in order to avoid confronting
the risk of perjury, or simply because they are accustomed
to this type of
17 2
evidence from their practice in their home jurisdiction.
Particularly given the possibility that a defendant may give an unsworn
statement, there is a strong argument that defense lawyers must do what is in
their power to prevent false sworn testimony by their clients at the ICC. If they
know that a client intends to testify falsely, they should first attempt to persuade
the client to testify truthfully or refrain from testifying. If that fails, they should
ensure that the client give an unsworn statement, rather than one under oath.
Allowing a client to give a false statement of any kind-whether sworn or notcreates a conflict with the attorneys' duty of candor and the truth-seeking goal of
international criminal trials. But the conflict is at least reduced when the
statement is unsworn. Allowing such a statement also permits the lawyer to
avoid the problematic alternative of withdrawing as counsel and allows the
defendant to have his say without making the attorney complicit in false
testimony. Finally, lawyers should not participate in eliciting even unsworn
statements that they know to be false; instead, they should let the client present
such statements in a narrative form.
The "unsworn statement" in narrative form appears to offer a reasonable
compromise between the competing interests at issue-on the one hand, the
right of the defendant to speak in his own defense, and the lawyer's duties of
loyalty and confidentiality; on the other, the fundamental goal of international
criminal trials to seek the truth and the lawyer's duty of candor to the court.
Other possible responses to the contemplated perjury all appear inferior in their
ability to accommodate these competing interests. These other options include:
withdrawal from the case; disclosing the intended or completed perjury to the
court; doing nothing and simply allowing the client to testify falsely under oath;
and finally, allowing the client to give sworn narrative testimony under oath.'73 It
is useful to consider each of these before returning to the benefits of the
unsworn narrative statement.
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See id at 1268 (reporting that continental European jurists are "astonished" that a defendant who
chooses to testify may be required to do so under oath).

173

All of these approaches, of course, assume that the lawyer has been unsuccessful in persuading
the client to testify truthfully or not to testify at all. If the lawyer succeeds in this endeavor, this
resolves the dilemma. In practice, the lawyer will often be able to dissuade the client from
testifying falsely, particularly when the lawyer has already built a good relationship of trust and
respect with the client. L. Timothy Perrin, The Perplexing Problem of Client Peiury, 76 Fordham L
Rev 1707, 1728-29 (2007). But when the lawyer fails in this attempt, the dilemma reappears, and
the lawyer must contemplate his next step in response.
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If the client insists on testifying in a manner that the defense attorney
knows to be false, the US Model Rules and a number of commentators suggest
that the lawyer should withdraw from representation. This action would
certainly be consistent with the lawyer's duty of candor to the court. At the same
time, it places the client and court in a difficult position. It disrupts the
proceedings and leaves the client without a lawyer until a replacement is found
and brought up to speed. If trial has already begun, withdrawal will often be
impractical, and courts might not even permit it.' 74 Finally, withdrawal merely
shifts the ethical problem to the next lawyer representing the defendant and risks
further withdrawals, delays, and disruptions.
In some circumstances, when withdrawal is not feasible, authorities suggest
that the only way to comply with the duty of candor is to inform the court of the
client's intention to give false testimony.'75 This also appears to be the only
effective remedial measure after the client has already testified falsely. 76 But
disclosure is obviously problematic in that it violates the lawyer's solemn duty to
keep confidential the information obtained from the client in the course of the
professional relationship.
Some commentators from adversarial systems have argued that if the client
insists on testifying, even if the lawyer knows that the testimony will be false, the
lawyer should not stand in the way. They reject withdrawal as impractical and see
disclosure to the court as a breach of the duty of confidentiality and a violation
of the client's right to effective defense.' 77 Moreover, some adopt the argument
that lawyers can never "know" with absolute certainty that testimony is false,
and can thereby evade the entire question on this ground.' 78 But the option of
allowing a client to commit perjury in an international criminal trial is not an
appropriate resolution of the underlying ethical dilemma. As described earlier,
both the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions ultimately reject this approach,
albeit for different reasons. Condoning client perjury is especially inappropriate
at international criminal trials, which place a premium on uncovering the
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Crystal, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 1539 (cited in note 159).
See id at 1541-43.
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See MRPC R 3.3(a)(3) (cited in note 1) ("[A] lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures [if
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false information is brought to his or her attention], including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal."). Another possibility is for the defendant to recant the false statement, but this will
typically be more prejudicial to his case.
See Freedman, 64 Mich L Rev at 1476-78 (cited in note 64); Monroe H. Freedman, Controversial

178

No More-The Peyug Tnlemma Revisited, 9 Prof Law 2 (Summer 1998); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth,
Juslice, and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Peuguy Rules, 47 Vand L Rev 339, 413-23
(1994).
Freedman, 9 Prof Law at 2 (cited in note 177); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud
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Problem as aJustinianQuartet:An ExtendedAnaysis, 25 Hofstra L Rev 1041, 1049, 1051-52 (1997).
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historical truth. And at the ICC, it is unnecessary to allow perjury to
accommodate the defendant's interest in speaking on his own behalf, since the
defendant can do so by providing an unsworn statement.
A final possible response, preferred by many American state jurisdictions,
is for the defendant to give evidence in narrative form, without any active
participation by the lawyer." 9 Under this approach, the defendant exercises his
right to testify, while the lawyer effectively disassociates himself from the
testimony and complies with his duty of candor to the court. The narrative
testimony approach might be seen to disclose implicitly the lawyer's doubts
about the veracity of the testimony. In the American context, the jury may not
understand this meaning of the narrative testimony. 8 ' But the judge is likely to
interpret it as a sign that the defense attorney wishes to distance himself from
the client's statements. Admittedly, this is likely to be the case in bench trials
such as those at international courts. The disclosure is never explicit, however,
and the reasons must only be supposed-thus preserving client confidentialityand the judges will still have the opportunity to evaluate the veracity of the
defendant's statement in light of other evidence in the case. The narrative
testimony approach thus has many attractive features when compared to the
alternatives.
At the ICC, a similar approach can be adopted, but improved upon from
the perspective of attorney ethics, by making the statement unsworn. An
unsworn statement delivered in narrative form offers a reasonable solution to
the dilemmas faced by a defense attorney whose client insists on making a
statement that the attorney knows to be false. It does not unduly compromise
the defendant's right to effective representation, and the lawyer could still
participate in eliciting those unsworn statements that the lawyer believes to be
truthful. The lawyer is not forced to entirely abandon the defendant and create
logistical problems for the court by withdrawing. Nor does the lawyer directly
reveal client confidences. Although the court may surmise the significance of the
unsworn statement-in other words, that the lawyer doubts its veracity-this
indirect and attenuated harm to the duty of confidentiality may be justified in
order to preserve the defense attorney's obligation to avoid participating in the
presentation of false testimony. It is also a better fit with the purpose of
uncovering the historical truth, one of the central purposes of international
criminal trials.

179

180

See, for example, McDowell, 669 NW2d at 225; People vJohnson, 72 Cal Rptr 2d 805, 817 (1998); see
also Crystal, 2003 U I11L Rev 1547-48 (cited in note 159).
See, for example, Commonwealth v Mitchell, No Crim A 9673 CR0312, 2000 WL 33119695, at *26
(Mass Super Ct 2000); Crystal, 2003 U II1L Rev at 1566 (cited in note 159).
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A commentary to the ICC Code of Conduct could clarify the duties of
counsel when a client insists on making a statement that counsel knows is false.
(Again, I am not addressing the scenario where the attorney merely doubts his
client-as discussed previously, an attorney must resolve reasonable doubts in
favor of the client). The commentary could explain that, if an ICC defense
counsel is faced with a scenario in which the attorney knows that the client plans
to testify falsely, whether from express admissions by the client or from
overwhelming circumstantial evidence, the lawyer ought to take steps to address
the problem. First, the attorney should confront the client with the problem of
potential perjury and try to persuade him to testify truthfully or otherwise not to
testify. In doing so, the attorney should explain his own ethical duty not to be
complicit in presenting perjured testimony, as well as the strategic risks of
presenting such testimony (for example, that the client's story may fall apart
under cross-examination and hurt the case more than remaining silent would). If
the client persists in his desire to testify untruthfully, the lawyer should insist that
the client give an unsworn statement in narrative form. In most cases, the client
is likely to be satisfied by this opportunity to state his position, and the court will
have the opportunity to assess its veracity in light of the other evidence
presented. Only if the client refuses to do so should the lawyer attempt to
withdraw.
The commentary should urge lawyers not to simply ignore the client's
intent to commit perjury. 8' The cost to the truth-seeking function of
international criminal trials is too high. Moreover, the need to fulfill the
defendant's right to speak on his own behalf, without foregoing representation,
is suitably accommodated by the option of providing an unsworn statement. The
possibility of guiding the client to give such a statement provides a reasonable
middle ground between the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions, as well as
between competing goals of international criminal law.
C. Representing an Innocent Client Who Wants To Plead
Guilty
Another area that gives rise to difficult ethical questions for criminal
defense attorneys concerns the division of authority between the client and the
lawyer over the direction of the case. When must a lawyer defer to the client's
decisions about the course of representation, and when is such deference
inappropriate? The clash between client and lawyer decision-making can occur in

181 In most jurisdictions in the US, the scenario would play out similarly, except that the option of
giving an unsworn statement would not be available. See note 160.
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a number of areas, such as the decisions whether the accused should assert
certain defenses and whether he should testify.
The first example I discuss concerns the decision by an innocent defendant
to plead guilty. Such occasions are not everyday occurrences, 1 2 but are not as
rare as they might first appear. The defendant may decide to admit guilt because
he is concerned about his chances of acquittal at trial and prefers the sentence
reduction that a guilty plea offers.183 He may want to accept responsibility for
the crime to protect loved ones who were involved.'84 Finally, in organized
crime and international crimes cases, the defendant may admit guilt to protect
family members who may suffer adverse consequences unless he accepts full
responsibility for the crime and refuses to cooperate in the investigation of
accomplices. 8 In many of these cases, given the defendant's statements to the
contrary, the lawyer may not even suspect that innocence is a possibility. But
occasionally, information in the case (for example, a corroborated albi that the
client now unconvincingly claims is false) may lead the attorney to believe that
the client is innocent.
If the lawyer strongly suspects that the client is innocent of all or some of
charges,
what are the lawyer's duties under the circumstances? Should the
the
lawyer persuade the client to plead not guilty, attempt to defend the client
despite his objections, bring the matter to the court's attention, or withdraw?
This is a scenario in which the tension between the duty to the client and duty to
the court resurfaces. Both the inquisitorial approach and international criminal
law's pedagogic and truth-seeking goals would suggest that the lawyer must first
try to persuade the client to contest the charges and, if that fails, bring the matter
to the court when the lawyer has a firm basis to believe that the client is in fact
innocent. This approach would also seem to be the most consistent with the
attorney's duty not to deceive or mislead the court.'86
The Codes of Conduct of international criminal courts generally give
clients authority over decisions concerning the objectives of representation.
182

183
18

185

186

The more common ethical quandary of American criminal defense attorneys is how strenuously
they should try to persuade a client to plead guilty when there is overwhelming evidence against
the client, but the client insists that he is innocent. See, for example, Anthony Amsterdam, 1 Trial
Manual5for the Defense of CriminalCases 339 (1988).
Albert W. Alschuler, The DefenseAltomy's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 Yale LJ 1179, 1296-97 (1975).
Kretschmer, Der StrafrechtlicheParteiverratat 50-51 (cited in note 145).
For a fictional twist on this scenario in an international criminal case, see Peter Robinson, The
Tribunal 124, 207 (iUniverse 2004).
As I discuss later, a plea is supposed to reflect the facts of the case. If an attorney leads the court
to believe that a client is guilty when the attorney knows that the client is innocent, this stands in
tension with the attorney's duty under Article 24 not to deceive or knowingly mislead the court.
See ICC Code of Profl Conduct, Art 24(3).
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Lawyers maintain authority over the means of representation, although they must
consult with their clients before making a decision.187 Lawyers may also refuse to
follow clients' instructions concerning objectives of representation if these
instructions are "inconsistent with counsel's duties under the Statute, the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, and this Code [of Conduct]."' 88 Furthermore,
lawyers may withdraw from representation, with the court's 8consent,
if their
9
client insists on pursuing an objective they consider repugnant. 1
The decision to plead guilty concerns the objectives of representation. The
answer under the ICC Code of Conduct may therefore appear clear: If a decision
concerns objectives, then the client should have the final say. But when an
innocent defendant pleads guilty, he is also effectively lying to the court. This
raises the question whether an attorney can knowingly participate in the
falsehood. More broadly, the conviction of an innocent person is inconsistent
with the fair administration of justice. This raises the additional question
whether counsel has a duty to ensure the fairness of the proceedings
independent of his duty to the client.
These questions have been debated at length in the US, where the
dominant view emphasizes the autonomy of the client to make key choices
about his case, including whether to plead guilty. Both constitutional rights and
rules of professional responsibility have been interpreted in ways that promote
the defendant's autonomy and limit the attorney's ability to override client
decisions concerning the objectives of representation. Constitutional doctrine
holds that the decision to plead guilty is a fundamental choice that, under the

187

The ICC Code of Conduct requires counsel to:

188

(a) Abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of his or her
representation as long as they are not inconsistent with counsel's duties under
the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and this Code; and (b)
Consult the client on the means by which the objectives of his or her
representation are to be pursued.
ICC Code of Profl Conduct, Art 14(2). Similarly, ICTR and ICTY Codes of Conduct require
counsel to "abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" unless
those decisions violate ethical duties. ICTR, Code of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel,
Art 4(2)(a) (Mar 14, 2008); Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the
International Tribunal ("ICTY Code of Profl Conduct"), Arts 8(B)(i), 8(C), ICTY Doc
IT/125/Rev.3 July 22, 2009). At the SCSL, the rules grant counsel greater independence and
provide that counsel does not have to abide by a client's decision if it is "inconsistent with
counsel's ... best professional judgement." Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel with the
Right of Audience before the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Art 14(a)(ii) (May 13, 2006).
ICC Code of Prof! Conduct, Art 14(2).

189

Id, Art 18(1)(a); ICTY Code of Profl Conduct, Arts 9(B)(i), 9(B)(ii) (cited in note 187) (allowing
withdrawal in the ICTY if counsel considers the objectives repugnant or imprudent or if the client
"persists in a course of action involving counsel's services that counsel reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent").
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Sixth Amendment, "the accused has the ultimate authority to make."'

Turner
90

Courts

nave supported the defendant's freedom to decide key questions about his
representation, even if these decisions are "ultimately to his own detriment. '
Of course, courts are generally free to reject plea agreements that they find to be
without factual basis. But the decision to plead guilty remains the prerogative of
the defendant.
Following a similar understanding of defendants' autonomy, American
courts have also allowed defendants to tender guilty pleas even while protesting
their innocence. 192 As two lower courts, cited by the Supreme Court in the
decision affirming this rule, explained: "An accused, though believing in or
entertaining doubts respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury
would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by
pleading guilty."' 9 3 Furthermore, "[r]easons other than the fact that he is guilty
may induce a defendant to so plead . . .and he must be permitted to judge for

himself in this respect."' 94 As long as the decision of the defendant is
competent, informed, and voluntary, it should be respected, regardless of
195
whether it advances or harms the defendant's interests.
Ethical rules in the US also emphasize the authority of criminal defendants
to make critical choices about their representation. The Model Rules view the
lawyer-client relationship as one of agency and require the lawyer to follow the
client's wishes as to the ends of representation, as long as they are not illegal.'9 6
This is generally true in other common-law jurisdictions as well, 9 7 with the
caveat that English barristers, as a general principle, are required to exercise their
own personal judgment in all professional activities."' Model Rule 1.2(a)
specifically provides that, "[i]n a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the
190 Jones vBarnes, 463 US 745, 751 (1983).
191 Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 834 (1975); see also Flanagan v United States, 465 US 259, 268
(1984) (affirming that with respect to the decision whether to choose self-representation, "the
defendant's free choice [is protected] independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding").

192

North Carolina vAford, 400 US 25, 37 (1970). The trial court must still review the plea to ensure

193

that it is voluntary, knowing, and rests on a strong factual basis.
McCoy v United States, 363 F2d 306, 308 (DC Cir 1966).

194

State v Kaufman, 2 NW 275, 276 (Iowa 1879) (dictum).

195 As noted earlier, guilty pleas must also rest on a factual basis, but in practice, review of the factual
basis is often perfunctory. See Jenia lontcheva Turner, JudicialPartiapationin Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AmJ Comp L 199, 212-13 (2006).
196 MRPC R 1.2(a), 1.2(a) cmt 1 (cited in note 1).
197

Hazard and Dondi, Legal Ethics: A Comparalive Study at 177-78 (cited in note 53) (contrasting
lawyer-client relationships in civil-law jurisdictions with those in common-law jurisdictions).

198

Id.
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client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered ....""' Given these provisions, it is not surprising that a recent survey
of American public defenders found that 99.4% of the respondents indicated
that "if there were disagreement about the20°decision to accept or reject a plea
bargain, the final call would be the client's."
Some commentators have argued, however, that when the lawyer knows
that the client is innocent, allowing the client to plead guilty would breach the
lawyer's duty of candor to the court. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger,
speaking in his personal capacity, once argued that "[w]hen an accused tells the
court he committed the act charged to induce acceptance of the guilty plea, the
lawyer to whom contrary statements have been made owes a duty to the court to
disclose such contrary statements so that the court can explore and resolve the
conflict., 21 Unless the lawyer reveals the conflict to the court, the lawyer would
effectively be allowing his client to present perjured testimony, in breach of his
duty of candor.20 2 Of course, the cases in which the lawyer "knows" that his
client is innocent can be expected to be relatively few, given that at least some
evidence to the contrary has ordinarily been gathered by the police and
prosecution. Under the Model Rules, the lawyer has another possible option in
these circumstances-to withdraw. The Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw if the
client insists on an action with which the lawyer fundamentally disagrees, or "if
the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the
lawyer reasonably believes is ...fraudulent., 20 3 The client's insistence on a false
guilty plea may provide a cause for withdrawal under either of these provisions.

199 MRPC R 1.2(a) (cited in note 1).
Rodney J. Uphoff and Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Dedsionmaking Between Defense Counsel and

200

Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decsionmaking 47 U Kan L Rev 1, 39-40
(1998). But see Alschuler, 84 Yale L J at 1279 (cited in note 176) (reporting results from
interviews with defense attorneys in the 1970s, in which interviewees had "adopted widely
differing attitudes toward the propriety of entering guilty pleas on behalf of defendants who
asserted their innocence").
201 Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conductfor Prosecution and Defense Personnel A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am
Crim L Q 11, 15 (1966-67); see also David G. Bress, Standards of Conductfor Prosecution and Defense
Personnel'An Attory's Viewpoint, 5 Am Crim L Q 23, 27 (1966-67). But see Alschuler, 84 Yale L J
at 1296-97 (cited in note 183); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U Pa L Rev 1117, 1173
(2008); Addison M. Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel- An Attorney's
Viewpoint, 5 Am Crim L Q 28, 31 (1966-67).
202 See Section III.B.
203 MRPC R 1.16(b)(2) (cited in note 1); see also Red Dog v State, 625 A2d 245, 247-48 (Del 1993)
(holding that the defendant's decision to accept death penalty was not, in itself, irrational; if the
lawyer is unable to represent a client who makes such a decision, or if death penalty is repugnant
to lawyer, the lawyer may seek to withdraw as long as the client is not prejudiced).
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In contrast to the adversarial approach, which tends to emphasize the
defendant's autonomy to make decisions about the case, inquisitorial systems
place a greater value on a lawyer's independence from clients. °4 French avocats,
for example, are expected to be more distant from their clients than their British
or American counterparts. They are not seen strictly as agents of their clients
and are not required to follow clients' instructions about the objectives of
representation.2 5 Similarly, most German authorities argue that criminal defense
attorneys do not always need to follow their clients' instructions, but are instead
supposed to determine independently what is in the best interests of the clients.
Commentators have grounded this conclusion in the principle of lawyer
independence2 6 as well as in lawyers' duty as "organs of the administration of
justice. 2 7 Under this more paternalistic approach, German lawyers are expected
to serve as guardians of the client's interests and to ensure that the client
20 8
receives a fair trial, even if the client givcs instructions to the contrary.
Reflecting an inquisitorial influence, the pan-European legal ethics code (CCBE
Code), which aims to harmonize ethics rules for lawyers in the European Union,
also emphasizes "more that attorneys protect clients' interests than that they
abide by client instructions., 2 9 Article 2.7 of the CCBE Code requires that
"[s]ubject to due observance of all rules of law and professional conduct, a
lawyer must always act in the best interests of the client. ' 210 In other words, even
if the defendant chooses, for whatever reason, not to mount a vigorous defense,
if the lawyer believes that it would be in the defendant's "best interests" to
zealously pursue all defenses available, the lawyer must choose the latter course.
The client is not the only or final arbiter of what type of representation is in his
own best interests. In inquisitorial systems, this is ultimately a question of the
lawyer's professional judgment.

204 Roger C. Cramton, A Comparalive Look at the Ethics Rules and ProfessionalIdeologies in a Time of Change,
in John J. Barcelo III and Roger C. Cramton, eds, Lanyers' Practice and Ideals:A Comparaive View
267, 269 (Kluwer 1999) (comparing the French and American systems).
205 Id; Leubsdorf, Man in His OrginalDigniy: Legal Ethics in France at 15-16 (cited in note 48).
206 Harting, Berufspflicbten des Strafverteidigers und SanktionierungPflichtwidnigen Verhaltens at 120, 122 (cited
in note 144).
207 See, for example, Kretschmer, Der StrafrechticbeParteiverratat 48-49 (cited in note 145).
208 See, for example, id at 48-49 (citing numerous authorities in support).
209 Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics. Developing a Code of Conduct for International
Arbitration, 23 Mich J Ind L 341, 370 (2002) (citing Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European
Community's Legal Ethics Part 1: An Anaysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 Geo J Legal Ethics 1, 36
(1993)).
210 Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Code of Conduct for European Lawyers Art 2.7
(2006).
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The "best interests" approach to attorney-client relations would suggest
that a lawyer need not follow the instructions of a client who wants to plead
guilty when evidence exists to prove his innocence. Indeed, some German
commentators have argued that a lawyer is required, as part of his duty as an
"organ of the administration of justice," to present to the court exculpatory or
mitigating evidence, even when the client has instructed the lawyer to the
contrary. One example discussed by commentators concerns a husband client
who tells his lawyer that he has not committed the crime in question, that his
girlfriend was the actual perpetrator, and that a certain witness can confirm this.
But the client adds that he is not interested in revealing the truth to the court,
because he wants to hide the extramarital affair from his wife."' In this and
other similar scenarios (including in deciding whether to assert an insanity
defense),212 the dominant view among German courts and commentators is that
a lawyer should act according to his own professional judgment concerning the
client's best interests.213 The lawyer may therefore disregard his client's
instructions, call the exculpatory witness to the stand, and generally conduct a
vigorous defense of the client whom he believes to be innocent. At the very
least, lawyers should consider withdrawing from representation when, despite
their firm belief in the client's innocence, they fail to convince the client to
contest the charges.214
A more paternalistic approach to the attorney-client relationship, akin to
that used in inquisitorial systems, would be a more appropriate fit for
international criminal courts in these circumstances. Such an approach would be
consistent with both the truth-seeking and educational goals of international
criminal law. Allowing the client to tender a false admission of guilt clashes with
the goal to uncover the historical truth about the crimes in question. If the
defendant accepts responsibility, the actual perpetrator remains unknown.
Particularly when a lower-level operative pleads guilty to crimes he did not
commit to shield higher-ups from exposure, his actions distort the historical
record and obscure the inner workings of a criminal regime. The failure to bring

211 Kretschmer, Der StrafrechtlicheParteiverratat 49-50 (cited in note 145) (citing Beulke, Der Verteidiger
im Strafvefahren at 86, 124 (cited in note 145)).
212 Another example that Kretschmer gives is that of a wife who claims she was the one who drove
drunk, in order to save her husband from losing his driver's license, since he needs to have the
license in order to keep his job. Id at 51.
213 See, for example, Harting, Berufrpflichten des Strafverteidigers und Sanklionierung Pflicbhwidn'gen Verhaltens
at 119-20 (cited in note 144); Beulke, Der Verteidigerim Strafverfahren at 124 (cited in note 145). But
see Kretschmer, DerStrafrechlicheParteiverratat 52 (cited in note 145) (disagreeing with this view).
214 Harting, Berufspflichten des Strafrerteidigers und Sanklionierung Pflichiwidigen Verhaltens at 120 (cited in
note 144); see also Dahs, Handbuch des Strafverteidigersat 38 Rn 52 (cited in note 144).
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to account those most responsible impedes efforts to prevent revisionism and
future conflicts in the affected territory.
In addition to distorting the historical record, false admissions of guilt
could undermine the legitimacy of international criminal justice. In most cases in
which an innocent defendant admits guilt with the acquiescence of his attorney,
the falsity of the admission will not be uncovered. Still, in some cases, evidence
exonerating the defendant may surface later. The discovery of such wrongful
convictions would seriously damage public confidence in the international
criminal trials and undercut the ability of these trials to promote the rule of law
and human rights.
The procedural regime on admissions of guilt at the ICC reflects these
concerns. Departing from the more traditional guilty-plea model of the ICTY
and ICTR, the ICC Statute allows for "proceedings on admission of guilt" only
when the court, after a thorough exanmrination of the evidence, is convinced that
the facts support such an admission. Whereas at the ICTY and ICTR, the factual
basis may rest on the "lack of any material disagreement between the parties
about the facts of the case," 215 at the ICC, judges must independently review the
available evidence to determine whether the facts support the admission of guilt.
Indeed, ICC judges may call on the prosecutor to present additional evidence if
they believe "that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is
required in the interests of justice., 216 These provisions of the ICC Statute
reflect the inquisitorial discomfort with guilty pleas that do not fully reflect the
underlying facts of the crime.
Given the preoccupation of the ICC Statute drafters with ensuring that
admissions of guilt reflect the true facts of the crime, it would appear anomalous
if counsel could acquiesce in the client's decision to present a false admission of
guilt. Instead, the more fitting response by counsel would be to bring concerns
about the falsity of the guilty plea to the court and let the court decide if the
defendant should in fact be allowed to admit guilt. This action would be
consistent with counsel's duties not to mislead the court.2 7
Some may object that this case is similar to that of a lawyer allowing a
client to give a false unsworn statement to the court. If a lawyer is allowed to
acquiesce in a decision by a client to make a false unsworn statement, then the
lawyer should similarly be allowed to acquiesce in a false admission of guilt. But
215

ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc IT/32/Rev.43 at 62 bis (iv) (2009).

216 ICC Statute, Art 65(4). As in the ICTY, ICTR and most domestic jurisdictions, "no contest" and

Alford pleas (in which the defendant protests his innocence) are also unlikely to be allowed. See
Prosecutor v Erdemovid, Case No IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
217

Vohrah,
29-31 (Oct 7, 1997).
ICC Code of Profl Conduct, Art 24(3).
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in the "unsworn statement" scenario, the defendant and the lawyer make no
representation to the court about the truth of the statement. By contrast, under
the ICC Statute, an admission of guilt is expected to conclusively reflect the facts
of the case."' For that reason, the lawyer has a stronger duty to reveal the falsity
of the admission of guilt in the latter circumstance.
It is likely, of course, that if counsel reveals or even threatens to reveal to
the court exculpatory evidence that the client wishes to keep secret, the
relationship between the client and the lawyer would deteriorate significantly. If
that happens, the client may dismiss the lawyer. Alternatively, the lawyer may
withdraw, consistent with Article 18 of the ICC Code of Conduct, on the
grounds that the client insists on pursuing an objective that counsel considers
repugnant. Withdrawal, while a reasonable response, will most likely just shift
the problem to another attorney, so it is not the optimal resolution of the
dilemma. In addition, both withdrawal and dismissal by the client may lead to
more cases of self-representation by defendants. Despite these potential
repercussions for the lawyer-client relationship, disclosure to the court (or
alternatively, withdrawal), remains a superior option to acquiescing in the
conviction of an innocent defendant.
In discussing the allocation of decision-making between attorneys and their
clients, therefore, the commentary to the ICC Code of Conduct should advise
defense attorneys that they would not be breaching their duties to their client by
refusing to acquiesce in a false admission of guilt. Instead, by disclosing the
falsity of the admission of guilt to the court, the attorneys would be fulfilling
their duty of candor to the court, acting in the best interests of the client, and
helping to ensure a fair outcome in the case. The commentary should also
discuss withdrawal as an appropriate response in this situation, while noting that
withdrawal does not resolve the dilemma, but likely shifts the burden to another
attorney. These comments would be especially helpful in guiding the conduct of
lawyers from adversarial traditions, under which attorneys are encouraged to
follow their clients' instructions even if they disagree with them. Because of the
possible conflict with the adversarial approach to this question, as Section IV
discusses in greater detail, the commentary should not at this point provide for
sanctions of lawyers who follow that approach.
D. Representing a Client Who Wants To Boycott the
Proceedings
A second scenario concerning the division of authority between client and
lawyer occurs frequently at international criminal courts. It concerns the

218

ICC Statute, Art 65(l)-(2).
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question of whether a lawyer ought to follow a client's instructions to boycott or
otherwise disrupt the proceedings. Again, the lawyer's duties to the court, as well
as the special goals of international criminal law, suggest that the lawyer should
decline to follow such instructions and withdraw from the case if necessary.
Contrary to some decisions by international criminal tribunals, however, this
Section argues that if the boycotting defendant unequivocally terminates the
lawyer's mandate, the lawyer's duty to the court does not require counsel to
continue representing the defendant against his wishes. Instead, when a
defendant persists in disrupting the proceedings and refuses the assistance of
counsel, counsel's withdrawal from representation is an appropriate and
reasonable response. In an effort to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the
proceedings, the court could still appoint the same or another attorney to act in
a somewhat different role, as standby counsel.
Disagreements between defense counsel and their clients about
participation in the proceedings are not uncommon at international criminal
courts."' A well-known example is the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a
former official in the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was charged
with genocide and crimes against humanity at the ICTR. After an unfavorable
decision by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, Barayagwiza sent a letter to the tribunal
claiming that the court would not be able to render "independent and impartial
justice,"'22 declaring that he would not attend the proceedings against him, and
stating that he had instructed his attorneys not to represent him further. 2 '
Barayagwiza's lawyers, who had been assigned by the tribunal to represent the
defendant because he could not afford counsel, filed a motion to withdraw in
response to their client's letter.222
The ICTR Chamber refused to allow the withdrawal, citing to ICTR Rule
45(1), which permitted assigned counsel to withdraw only "in the most
exceptional circumstances., 223 The Chamber explained that it wished to provide
Barayagwiza "the opportunity for further reflection" and that denial of the

220

See, for example, Prosecutor v Taylor, Case No SCSL-2003-01-T, Transcript of Prosecution
Opening Statement, 8-10, 18-26 (June 4, 2007); Prosecutor v Sesay, Case No SCSL-04-15-T-285,
14-28 (Nov 23,
Gbao-Decision on Appeal against Decision on Withdrawal of Counsel,
2004); Prosecutorv Miloeti, Case No IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel's Motion for
5-7 (Dec 7, 2004); Prosecutorv BarayagwiZa, Case No ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on
Withdrawal,
17-19 (Nov 2, 2000).
Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw,
Ntanda Nsereko, 12 Crim L F at 501 (cited in note 12); BarayagwiZa, Case No ICTR 97-19-T,

221

Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw at 5 (quoting Barayagwiza's letter).
Ntanda Nsereko, 12 Crim L F at 501 (cited in note 12).

222

Id; see also Prosecutorv Nahimana, Case No ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment,

223

BarayagwiZa, Case No ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw at
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motion to withdraw was "in the interest of preserving the Accused's rights. 224
Still, Barayagwiza persisted in his boycott, so the attorneys filed another motion
to withdraw. The attorneys argued that continued representation would violate
the ICTR Code of Conduct, as well as their national ethical codes, which
225
prohibit counsel from representing a client who has terminated their mandate.
The Chamber dismissed their argument. It pointed out that Barayagwiza's
instructions for counsel not to defend him were an attempt to boycott and
obstruct judicial proceedings and therefore counsel were not under an obligation
to follow them. Furthermore, the court held that, under the ICTR Rules and
Code of Conduct, counsel were obliged "to mount an active defence in the best
interest of the Accused" and to "ensure that the Accused receives a fair trial";
therefore, counsel had to continue representing the defendant despite his wishes
226
to the contrary.
The Barayagwiza decision shows how the guardianship approach to lawyerclient relations can be taken too far. It is true that lawyers should not follow
instructions by the client to obstruct or otherwise defy the proceedings. Even in
adversarial systems, lawyers are prohibited by ethical rules from following' 2 a7
client's instructions to engage in conduct "intended to disrupt a tribunal.
Under all major ethical regimes, therefore, if the client requests his lawyers to
take measures that the lawyers consider frivolous or obstructive, lawyers must
refuse to follow the client's instructions and proceed with the representation
according to their best professional judgment.
But when the client completely refuses to cooperate with his lawyers and
attempts to terminate their mandate-a particular problem in many international
criminal cases-the lawyers' only viable option is to withdraw. To continue
representation, despite instructions to the contrary, would violate national and
international Codes of Conduct, which provide that lawyers must halt
224

Ntanda Nsereko, 12 Crim L F at 502 (cited in note 12).

225

Id.

226

BarayagwiZa, Case No ICTR 97-19-T, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw at 21.
A few months later, after counsel filed another motion to withdraw, the Chamber granted it, upon
finding that the defendant had unequivocally terminated the lawyers' mandate. Nabimana, Case
No ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment at 83.
MRPC R 3.5(d) (cited in note 1). The Comment to the Rule elaborates as follows:

227

The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause
may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous
conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A
lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation;
the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An
advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and
preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by
belligerence or theatrics.
Id, cmt 4.
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representation when a client unequivocally discharges them.2 28 It would also
create a serious and persistent tension between the lawyers' duties to consult the
client's wishes on his representation and to aid the court in ensuring a fair trial.
Continued representation could also create an erroneous public perception that
the defendant is fully represented, when in fact counsel are not receiving any
instructions from the defendant.229
Forcing the lawyers to continue representing a defendant contrary to his
wishes, as the ICTR Trial Chamber did in Barayagwiza, wrongly stretches the
interpretation of counsel's duty to ensure a fair trial. A better approach is that
developed subsequently by the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(another UN-sponsored, but nationally-based, war crimes court). These courts
have allowed counsel of uncooperative defendants to withdraw, but then
appointed "standby counsel" or amid curiae to assist the courts in providing a fair
230
trial.
Standby counsel are expected to be engaged actively in the proceedings and
to be prepared to take over from the accused if the latter unduly disrupts the
proceedings.2 31 While standby counsel are charged with looking out for the
interests of the defendant, they are understood not to be taking directions from
the defendant. They are present to ensure the fairness and effectiveness of the
proceedings.2 32 The special designation as standby counsel makes this mandate
clear-to the defendant, the attorney, and the public.233

228 See, for example, Richard J. Wilson, "Emaciated" Defense or a Trend to Independence and Equaliy of
Arms in InternaionaliZed Criminal Tribunals?, 15 Hum Rts Brief 6, 7 (2008), online at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/15/152.cfm (visited Nov 21, 2009) (commenting with
approval on the withdrawal by Karim Khan, defense attorney for Charles Taylor, after Taylor
terminated Khan's mandate in an effort to boycott the proceedings).
229 Jorgensen, 4J Intl Crim Just at 73 (cited in note 12).
230

231

See, for example, Prosecutorv Seej, Case No IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with His Defence,
20-27 (May 9, 2003);
Prosecutor v Norman, Case No SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, 13-14 (June 14, 2004) (reading
Consequential Order on Assignment and Role of Standby Counsel).
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in InternationalCriminalLaw at 253 (cited in note 12). In Prosecutor v Sereyl,
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after the defendant continuously disrupted the proceedings, the Trial Chamber asked standby
counsel to take over representation from the accused. Prosecutor v . ejel, Case No IT-03-67-PT,
Decision on Assignment of Counsel,
79-81 (Aug 21, 2006).
Tuinstra, Defence Counsel in InternationalCriminalL-awat 252, 252 n 50, 254 (cited in note 12).

233

See Jorgensen, 4 J Intl Crim Just at 72 (cited in note 12); Tuinstra, 4 J Intl Crim Just at 55-56
(cited in note 12). But see Prosecutor v Krajifnik, Case No IT-00-39-A, Decision on Momeilo
Krajignik's Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel's Motions in Relation to the Appointment of
Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007,
80-81 (May 11, 2007)
(separate opinion of Judge Schomburg) (arguing that the position of amicus curiae will create
conflicts of interest for counsel and that it is better to impose counsel on the accused instead).
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The proposed approach of appointing standby counsel offers a reasonable
compromise between the inquisitorial and adversarial views of the lawyer-client
relationship. In adversarial systems, attorneys are supposed to advance their
clients' interests only as the clients define them. 234 For that reason, any
appointment of counsel by the court in order to serve the interests of a fair trial
is viewed with skepticism. 235 As Mirjan Dama~ka has commented, in adversarial
systems, "the state cannot impose counsel on the litigants, for where individual
autonomy is extolled, parties must be free to hire and fire their lawyers, no
matter how important the issues involved in the case or how skewed the
proceedings become when a party chooses to manage his case personally."23' 6 By
contrast, inquisitorial systems commonly allow the imposition of counsel on
defendant in serious cases. Such assignment of counsel is seen to be in the best
interest of the defendant and to serve the public interest of providing a fair
trial.

237

The option of appointing standby counsel offers a reasonable middle
ground between these two traditions, both of which have influenced
international criminal law on this question. As the adversarial tradition
recognizes, the outright imposition of defense counsel on an obstreperous
defendant can be perceived as trying to muzzle the defendant and denying him
the right to self-representation. At the same time, allowing a defendant to
instruct a lawyer to boycott the trial interferes with the ability to provide a fair
trial and harms the legitimacy of the court. The appointment of standby counsel
can help the court conduct its proceedings fairly and effectively, without unduly
interfering with the defendant's right to self-representation. 238 As noted earlier,
compared to court-assigned counsel, the designation of standby counsel also has

234

Damaika, The Faces ofJusice and State Authoriy at 142 (cited in note 47).

235

Appointments of stand-by and advisory counsel do exist in adversarial systems to prevent the

236

derailment of the trial by the defendant. See McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168 (1984). But the role of
these attorneys is quite circumscribed, and their involvement is often disfavored by courts. See,
for example, Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in CriminalCases: Inthe Twilght Zone of
the Criminal Justice System, 75 NYU L Rev 676, 684 (2000) (describing courts' ambivalence to
assigning standby counsel); Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation:Standing the Two-Sided Coin on
Its Edge, 38 Wake Forest L Rev 55, 75 (2003) (noting that courts disfavor "hybrid representation,"
whereby counsel participates more actively in the case than ordinary stand-by counsel do, in such
activities as jury selection, opening statements, examination of witnesses, and closing arguments).
Dama~ka, The Faces ofJustice and State Authoriy at 141-42 (cited in note 47).

237

See Tuinstra, Defence Counselin InternationalCriminalLawat 246 (cited in note 12).

238 See, for example, e.(ej, Case No IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with His Defence at
20-27. Radovan Karad i's
boycott of his first day of trial at the ICTY is only the most recent reminder as to why some form
of backup counsel is necessary to allow the tribunals to function fairly and effectively. See Marlise
Simons, Karadjd to Boycott Start of War Crimes Trial,NY Times (Oct 22, 2009).
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the advantage of minimizing the tensions that may arise between counsel's duties
to the client and to the court.239
A commentary to Article 14 of the ICC Code of Conduct could clarify
that, although lawyers are generally supposed to follow clients' instructions
about the objectives of representation, lawyers can and should disregard these
instructions when the client's aim is to boycott the proceedings or otherwise
bring the court into disrepute. 4' The comments could make clear that counsel
would not be breaching their duties to the court if they seek to withdraw when
the client discharges them, even if the discharge appears to be an attempt to
boycott the proceedings. The comments (and perhaps parallel Regulations of the
Court 241) could further clarify that the court may not ask a lawyer to continue
representing a client who has unequivocally terminated the lawyer's mandate. In
that situation, the court could instead ask lawyers to assume representation
under a special designation as standby counsel.
IV. IMPLEMENTING ETHICAL NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS
As previous sections have suggested, the most appropriate method of
implementing the ethical guidelines I have proposed would be through
nonbinding comments to the ICC Code of Conduct. Even if the guidelines were
to become broadly accepted and eventually adopted as binding, two principal
reasons support gradual implementation. First, because international criminal
defense attorneys come from diverse legal backgrounds and have limited
interactions in international courts, it will take some time and effort for them to
accept and apply new ethical guidelines at the international level. Second, neither
attorneys nor courts have yet attempted to develop a distinct set of ethical
guidelines consistent with the purposes of international criminal justice. Further
deliberation on this topic will be necessary before attorneys and courts agree on
concrete rules. For these reasons, it is best to begin the process of
implementation by adopting nonbinding guidelines. They can then be reinforced
239

See notes 231-33 and accompanying text.

240

Effectively, the commentary would bring together the lawyers' duties under Article 24(1) of the

241

ICC Code of Conduct ("Counsel shall take all necessary steps to ensure that his or her actions or
those of counsel's assistants or staff are not prejudicial to the ongoing proceedings and do not
bring the Court into disrepute.") and Article 14(2)(a) of the same Code ("When representing a
client, counsel shall: (a) Abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of his or her
representation as long as they are not inconsistent with counsel's duties under the Statute, the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and this Code....").
These Regulations could supplement the current Regulation 78, which simply states that "[p]rior
to withdrawal from a case, defence counsel shall seek the leave of the Chamber." ICC Regulations
of the Court, ICC-BD/01-02-07 (Dec 18, 2007).
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through training programs for lawyers and judicial references to the guidelines in
2 42

court.

The diverse legal backgrounds of defense attorneys are an important
consideration in any effort to reform practices in international courts. Attorneys
come to these courts from both inquisitorial and adversarial backgrounds and
bring diverging conceptions of their professional obligations. Their adjustment
to new procedures and practices has at times been relatively slow.243
International attorneys do not all belong to the same bar association, and even
court-specific professional associations, such as the Association for Defense
Counsel (ADC) at the ICTY, have only recently emerged. Moreover, attorneys
have had few opportunities to interact with one another because of frequent
travels, language differences, and a high rate of turnover.2"
Over time and in the course of repeated interactions with the international
courts, defense attorneys' understandings of their professional obligations will
likely begin to converge. At least at the ICTY, the ADC has facilitated this
process since its creation in 2002, by providing a forum for the exchange of
information and experiences, offering training programs, and even exercising
independent disciplinary powers. 245 To give one example, the ADC has held
training sessions on the topic of cross-examining victim-witnesses in a sensitive
manner. 246 Still, at the ICTY and ICTR, the attorneys' beliefs about certain
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For a discussion of different approaches to the implementation of ethical norms in the American

243

context, consider Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of SelfDefeat and a CallforReturn to the Ethical,Moral,and PracticalApproachof the Canons, 83 N C L Rev 411
(2005); Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of EthicalCodes, 1989 Ann Surv Am L 7 (1990); Deborah L.
Rhode, InstitutionalijngEthics, 44 Case W Res L Rev 665 (1994).
McMorrow, 30 B C Intl & Comp L Rev at 148 (cited in note 12).
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See, for example, id at 148-52; Walsh, 1 J Intl Crim Just at 494 (cited in note 96).
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Association of Defence Counsel Formally

246

Recognized by the ICTY, Dec 19, 2002, online at http://www.icty.org/sid/8041 (visited Nov 21,
2009); see Association of Defence Counsel Practising Before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, Objectives, online at http://www.adcicty.org (visited Nov 21, 2009)
(follow "ADC-ICTY" drop-down menu; then follow "Objectives" hyperlink) (listing "to oversee
the performance and professional conduct of Defence Counsel" as one of the objectives of the
ADC-ICTY).
Turner, 48 Va J Intl L at 569 n 193 (cited in note 13). Some attorneys apparently dismiss the
importance of these training sessions. They argue that the training is done only for strategic
reasons-so that lawyers learn how to cross-examine victim-witnesses in a way that would be
considered appropriate by the judges, who dislike aggressive cross-examination of such witnesses.
Email from Kevin Jon Heller, Senior Lecturer, Melbourne Law School, to author, Sept 28, 2009.
But even if done purely for strategic reasons, such training can still have a harmonizing effect on
the practices and attitudes of international defense attorneys.
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ethical questions continue to differ based on whether the lawyers come from
inquisitorial or adversarial jurisdictions.24 7
In addition, international criminal law scholars, judges, and practitioners
have yet to engage in a thorough discussion about the appropriate framework
for legal ethics at international criminal courts. The Codes of Conduct adopted
so far at international criminal courts largely reflect national ethical rules. The
ICTY and ICTR Codes were influenced primarily by the American Model
Rules,248 and the ICC Code was in turn a blend
of the ICTY and ICTR Codes
2 49
systems.
inquisitorial
of
rules
and the ethical
Some defense attorneys may resist the idea of engaging in a broad-based
discussion of the goals of international criminal trials and the implications of
these goals for ethical rules. Many defense attorneys are likely to disagree with
the notion that their ethical duties should be significantly influenced by the
broader political aims of international criminal justice.250 But even if defense
attorneys remain skeptical of the broader purposive approach advocated in this
Article, they appear to accept the more concrete limits on their conduct. For
example, in a survey of international criminal defense attorneys conducted by
this author, about half of the respondents stated that they would refrain from
impeaching a truthful witness.2 5' Respondents also overwhelmingly appeared to
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Turner, 48 Va J Intl L at 569 n 194 (cited in note 13) (reporting results from interviews with
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ICTY and ICTR defense attorneys and finding that attorneys from inquisitorial systems were less
likely to say they would impeach a witness whom they believed to be testifying truthfully); Stefan
Kirsch, Draft Code of Conductfor Counsel Before the ICC 12 (2004) (indicating resistance by lawyers
from inquisitorial traditions to the notion that the client's interest should come "before counsel's
own interests or those of any other person, organization or State").
Michael Bohlander, International Criminal Defence Ethics: The Law of Professional Conduct for Defence
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CounselAppearingBefore InternationalCriminalTribunals, 1 San Diego Intl L J 75, 78 (2000).
Walsh, 1 J Intl Crim Just at 497 (cited in note 96).
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In interviews and surveys conducted by this author, ICTY and ICTR defense attorneys
consistently emphasized that their foremost duty was to provide a fair trial to their client and that
any other goal of international criminal trials was incidental to their work. Turner, 48 Va J Intl L
at 566-69 (cited in note 13).
See id at 569 n 194. Thirty-three respondents gave clear answers to this question. Eleven of the
respondents were answering the question whether they would "impeach a witness whom [they]
believe to be testifying truthfully." Another twenty-two were responding to a somewhat differently
worded question-whether they would cross-examine aggressively a victim-witness whom they
know to be testifying truthfully. These respondents were asked to assume that they "know this for
a fact-whether because of something [their] client told [them] or because of documents that
confirm the veracity of the witness's statements." The percentage of attorneys reluctant to
impeach rose only slightly under the second formulation of the question. Whereas 45.5 percent of
the attorneys said they would not impeach a witness they befieved to be testifying truthfully, 50
percent of (different) respondents said they would refrain from cross-examining aggressively a
victim-witness they know to be testifying truthfully. Attorneys coming from inquisitorial countries
were much more willing to accept such a limitation on their cross-examination of adverse
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support the idea that they should not present testimony that they believe is
false.2 2 Perhaps in reflection of this consensus, the Code of Conduct drafted by
the International Criminal Bar (ICB) proposed that "[c]ounsel may refuse to
offer evidence that counsel reasonably believes is false, irrelevant, or lacks probative
value. 2 53 As discussed earlier, this provision could be construed as permitting
defense attorneys to refrain from introducing client testimony they reasonably
believe is false. In short, defense attorneys may be more willing to accept the
purposive approach advocated in this Article once they focus on the specific
proposals for resolving ethical dilemmas in concrete situations.
Until international courts and practitioners have had sufficient opportunity
to discuss and agree upon the demands that the unique purposes of the
international criminal justice system place on legal ethics, the best approach is to
enact nonbinding ethical guidelines. These guidelines could be developed by the
same participants that helped draft the ICC Code of Conduct: the ICC Registrar,
national and international bar associations and non-governmental organizations,
and the Bureau of the Assembly States Parties to the ICC. Because the
guidelines would not be binding, they are likely to be easier to adopt than formal
amendments to the Code of Conduct.
Judges and professional associations could contribute to the
implementation of the new guidelines. Judges can refer to them when they
encounter inconsistent conduct in the proceedings before them. At the ICTY,
judges were the main actors driving the development of shared ethical norms,
through both formal and informal sanctions.2 4 At the ICC, too, they could
contribute to the inculcation of ethical norms through comments to counsel
from the bench and in opinions.
Finally, professional associations of defense attorneys at international
criminal courts can acclimate lawyers to the new norms through training
programs, meetings, and disciplinary measures. Although ICC lawyers have not
yet formed such an association, this is likely to occur as the court takes on more
cases. The ICB is perhaps most likely to evolve into this role. In 2002, it was
established to represent the interests of all international defense attorneys, but its
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254

witnesses. About two-thirds of inquisitorial attorney respondents stated that they would refrain
from impeaching truthful witnesses, whereas only 38 percent of adversarial respondents accepted
the same limitation.
Although only thirteen respondents answered this question, twelve of them said they would not
present client testimony that they believe is perjurious, and only one said that he or she would do
SO.
International Criminal Bar, Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedure, Art 49(2) (2003)
(emphasis added).
McMorrow, 30 BC Intl & Comp L Rev at 166 (cited in note 12).
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focus is on lawyers practicing before the ICC.2 5 As of November 2006, onethird of the ICC's list of counsel and half of counsel currently assigned to cases
at the ICC were members of the ICB.25 6 The organization aspires to become a
more central institutional representative of defense interests at the ICC. 2 17 In the
meantime, the ICC Office of Public Counsel for the Defense, which has set as
its goal "to constitute an institutional memory for the Defence and to establish a
resource centre" for defense counsel 2 5 has the potential to help socialize and
train defense attorneys in a common set of ethical practices.
If accepted and reinforced by ICC judges, disciplinary authorities, and
professional associations, the nonbinding guidelines proposed in this Article
could play a part in developing a shared set of professional ethical customs and
understandings among ICC defense attorneys.25 9 Because the guidelines would
reflect the broader moral commitments of the international criminal justice
system, they should appeal to ICC lawyers and judges. And since they aim to
accommodate both adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to ethics, they have
the potential to claim broad acceptance among defense practitioners.
If these ethical norms solidify over time, it is possible that international
criminal courts could convert the flexible guidelines into binding rules.
Development of legal ethics regulation at the national level has often followed a
similar trajectory: from recommendations initially enforced primarily through a
mix of informal pressure and occasional judicial comment, to more
comprehensive codification of binding rules enforced by both courts and bar
associations.2 60 In the meantime, at this early stage of development of
international legal ethics, a deliberative and gradual approach, consistent with the
goals of international criminal justice system, appears most sensible.
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Starr, EnsuringDefense Counsel Competence at InternationalCriminalTribunals at *16 (cited in note 117).
Virginia Lindsay, Executive Committee of the ICB, Address at the Fifth Session of the Assembly
of States Parties to the Rome Treaty 1 (Nov 24, 2006), online at http://217.148.84.127/bpiicb/files/speech.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2009).
The organization has been holding and participating in training sessions for all counsel admitted
to practice before the ICC. Moreover, it has engaged in regular consultations with the ICC
Registry on issues of importance to ICC defense counsel. Id.
International Criminal Court, Structure of the Court, Defence, The Office of Public Counsel for
the
Defence,
online
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court
/Defence/Office+of+Public+Counsel+for+the+Defence (visited Nov 21, 2009).
Consider Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce C. Green, ReconceptualiingAdvocagEthics, 74 Geo Wash L
Rev 1, 5 (2005) (discussing the creation of a "professional conscience," or the implicit
understanding by lawyers that their duties to the court and to the legal system impose certain
limits on their decisions to engage in aggressive advocacy).
See id at 36-38; Moore, 1989 Ann Surv Am L at 15 (cited in note 242).
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V. CONCLUSION
Like their domestic counterparts, international criminal defense attorneys
face difficult ethical questions when trying to resolve tensions between their
duties to clients and to the court. In deciding whether to impeach a witness
whom they know to be truthful, for example, attorneys must balance their duty
to represent their client aggressively against their duties not to mislead the court
or unduly burden witnesses. Similar conflicts arise when a client wants to testify
untruthfully, decides to admit guilt falsely, or seeks to boycott the proceedings.
At international criminal courts, such questions should not be resolved
solely by reference to domestic ethical traditions. These traditions often conflict
in their approaches to key ethical dilemmas facing criminal defense attorneys.
More importantly, domestic approaches sometimes fail to take into account the
special goals of international criminal trials, which are broader than the goal of
determining culpability according to fair procedures. These goals include
compiling an accurate historical record of the crimes, spreading a message about
the importance of human rights, and giving victims a voice and a sense of
closure.
This Article has proposed an approach that recognizes and reflects the
unique purposes of international criminal trials. This purposive approach
respects the diversity of legal traditions that have helped shape the international
courts, as well as the professional experiences of lawyers who practice there. It
draws on the most appropriate practices from both the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems to create ethical guidelines best suited to the objectives of
the forum in which they are applied. An understanding of these distinctive
purposes is the best foundation for a system of ethics that is both effective and
capable of widespread acceptance.
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